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Abstract 
 
 
 
This thesis argues that some literary works of William Faulkner, Virginia Woolf, 
and Vladimir Nabokov both engage and represent fictional memory and support 
certain claims made by memorial studies that explain memories as coming into existence 
through a dynamic process, being transformed from their original state to incorporate 
knowledge learned at a time later than that of the memory’s formation. The thesis 
examines how it is that the mind is socially conditioned into a predetermined notion of 
reality, maintained by collective memory. This conditioning takes place at the onset of 
memory formation and results in limiting the mind to a finite number of memories. 
Rather than continuously creating new memories, the mind compiles very few memories 
that conform to social reality. This aggregate effect creates the allusion that new 
memories are created throughout life; whereas, the idea of a new memory is actually 
synonymous with a product of the imagination, a product that is limited in most after a 
certain point in development. Faulkner’s As I Lay Dying and The Sound and the Fury 
exhibit the mnemonic processes of association. This thesis shows that memorial 
association, while helping to strengthen long-term memories, directly causes 
confabulation; however, what these texts, along with Faulkner’s Light in August and 
Nabokov’s Speak, Memory, and Virginia Woolf’s To the Lighthouse also demonstrate is a 
questioning of a learned notion of reality. I argue that this reality is an entirely subjective 
construct and one that prevents certain experiences from becoming memories.  
 Introduction 
 
 
 
 
Jorge Luis Borges writes in Funes the Memorious that nineteen years before Ireno 
Funes encountered the story’s narrator, he fell off of a horse, and “when he fell, he’d 
been knocked unconscious; when he came to again, the present was so rich, so clear, that 
it was almost unbearable, as were his oldest and even his most trivial memories” (Borges 
135). The man who fell off his horse shortly afterwards to “learn he was crippled” 
(Borges 135) suffered an unusual disability, if that is what we are to term his malady. He 
possessed no ailment of the physical body but only that of the mind. On gaining 
consciousness, Funes understood that “now his perception and his memory were perfect” 
(Borges 135). Every experience, every thought, imagination and dream remained in his 
mind for conscious recall at will—“anything he thought, even once, remained 
ineradicably with him” (Borges 135). The narrative structure of this story juxtaposes 
Funes’ unnatural ability to the normal state of the human mind. The story of Funes is told 
not by the man who remembers all but rather by a narrator of normal mental capacities, 
who writes in his first line, “I recall him (though I have no right to speak that sacred 
verb—only one man on earth did” (Borges 131). This man who speaks represents the 
normal human mind. 
 I introduce the story of Funes the Memorious in the introduction of this thesis for 
the purpose of questioning what it means to be unable to forget. Funes claims that “I, 
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myself, alone, have more memories than all mankind since the world began” (Borges 
135), a statement which speaks to the vast capabilities of the conscious mind. Funes and 
the narrator have a reciprocal relationship throughout, in that we come to understand 
Funes by comparison to the narrator as we see from the narrative’s opening. 
Comparatively, we initially read the narrator as one who is inadequate, a term that he 
bestows upon himself. He is so because unlike this one man, Funes, some of his waking 
moments escape his conscious thought. Yet, is that not the point, the realization that this 
narrator can actually participate in thought? When the mind is in a constant state of 
memory formation, there is no time allowed to ruminate. To participate in thought, the 
mind must collect a finite set of memories to coalesce into an interpretive form. Now, one 
may point to the fact that Funes creates a numbering system “original with himself” 
(Borges 135). However, rather than this signifying organic thought, this statement seems 
to speak more toward a necessary method to organize all of his memories. For Borges 
writes, “his original motivation, I think, as his irritation that the thirty-three Uruguayan 
patriot should require two figures and three words rather than a single figure…” (Borges 
136). Thus, his “thoughts,” however we wish to construe them, are purposed for the sake 
of his already existing memories rather than for the thoughts themselves.  
 To this point, Funes claims, “my memory, sir, is like a garbage heap,” (Borges 
135) a place to story the most unnecessary of items. In Borges’ Funes the Memorious, we 
look to understand the complexities of human memory. Why does the mind not normally 
retain all experience in memory? Is there a benefit to forgetting? Why do we forget what 
we forget and remember what we remember? Paul Ricoeur writes, “the function of fiction 
is to wrest the conditions of totalization from their concealment, to dislodge us from time 
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in order to bring us to its roots or first principles” (Time and Narrative: Volume 3 140). 
The point of fiction will, thus, in this thesis employ a neuroaesthetic perspective about 
literature to unveil principles of memory.  
This thesis contends that the mind’s memories can be studied through the 
products of the mind, that which we can name a neuroaesthetic. Neurobiologist and 
pioneer of the study of neuroaesthetics, Eric Kandel, argues that the field of 
neuroaesthetics reveals critical connections between art, mind, and neurobiology, “Art, 
on the other hand, provides insight into the more fleeting, experiential qualities of mind, 
what a certain experience feels like. A brain scan may reveal the neural signs of 
depression, but a Beethoven symphony reveals what that depression feels like” (The Art 
of Insight xvi). It is thus that literature is inarguably a brilliant presentation of the inner 
workings of the individual human mind, and will serve as our aesthetic form throughout 
this thesis. In doing so, we shall look to authors such as William Faulkner, Virginia 
Woolf, and Vladimir Nabokov to reveal memory’s complexities. This study is not the 
first to analyze memory through the guise of literature. Often one can find the analysis of 
fictional works such as those of Marcel Proust and Toni Morrison. This thesis by no 
means intends to suggest that the works I choose to exemplify are the only appropriate 
examples of a literary aesthetic dealing with memory. Nor does it mean to suggest that 
those works not included, such as Proust and Morrison, cannot deliver as vibrant 
examples of the mind’s workings. Rather, we shall strives to cite examples that have 
perhaps never been examined within this neuroaesthetic context and examples that 
complement one another, both in regard to neuroaesthetic and literary significance. This 
thesis will focus on the nuances of memory; shared memory, individual memory, and 
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collective memory will play large roles, particularly in the consideration of how social 
processes affect the mind and the mind’s memories. Chapter One begins with a 
discussion of memory formation and memorial associations. Here we focus primarily on 
two Faulknerian novels, The Sound and the Fury and As I Lay Dying. The purpose of this 
chapter is to establish a neurobiological framework of memory as it relates to mental 
functions and how it presents itself throughout literature. Once established, Chapter One 
will argue that the nature of association found in memory results in limiting the mind to a 
finite number of memories that develop in childhood. Rather than continuously creating 
new memories, the mind compiles very few memories that conform to social reality. This 
aggregate effect creates the allusion that new memories are created throughout life; 
whereas, the idea of a new memory is actually synonymous with a product of the 
imagination, a product that is limited in most after a certain point in development.  
 This notion will lead us into a focus of the mind’s imagination, with particular 
attention being paid to the discrepancies between memory and imagination. How is the 
imagination different from a memory? How is the imagination formed and does it form 
from a memory? In the opening parts of Chapter Two, we focus on two works of 
Vladimir Nabokov: his short story, “That in Aleppo Once…” and Speak, Memory, as well 
as Virginia Woolf’s novel, To the Lighthouse.  These works assist in analyzing the unique 
qualities of the imagination. What distinguishes the imagined products that we shall find 
in such works from their memorial counterparts is a conscious realization of a 
problematic aspect of the external reality. As we move into the second portion of Chapter 
Two, we discuss the relationship between the mind and the mind’s society. Often times 
the reality of the mind and that of the society differ to a point that hampers an 
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individual’s ability to comprehend.  Blame for this conventionally falls on language as 
supplying the means by which the mind is taught to label and write its thoughts and 
memories in a manner that is not always true. Language is institutionalized, 
conventionalized, and thus desensitized within the individual mind. Though an 
established form of collective communication is necessary for the mind to develop past 
the point of object permanence, it is also later preventative to individual thought. 
Language prohibits individual interpretation; perception and interpretation process in the 
mind through linguistic strongholds and are then stored in the same manner. However, as 
we shall see in the minds of infants, minds that abide by conventions of a collective 
language are minds functioning against a natural state.  
 Chapter Three will examine how the mind is socially conditioned into a 
predetermined notion of reality and then maintained by collective memory. This 
conditioning takes place at the onset of memory formation and results in confusion 
between the individual memory framework and the collective memory framework. Texts 
such as Faulkner’s The Sound and the Fury and “A Rose for Emily” together with 
Nabokov’s Speak, Memory and Woolf’s To the Lighthouse demonstrate a questioning of 
a learned notion of reality, one that is pertinent only to the collective framework. The 
individual mind thus struggles to contend between the discrepancies of what the 
collective memory framework instructs the individual to believe and what the individual 
mind finds to be true on its own accord.  This collective reality prevents subjective 
construct and certain experiences from becoming memories. Other experiences that do 
come to memory will at times be confabulated for the purposes of appeasing the 
individual mind. This can still be a mind under the influence of a collective framework 
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and is often times one that is under distress to manage properly between the two. This 
thesis concludes by returning to Borges’ Funes the Memorious but now in the context of 
relating the text to Faulkner’s Light in August. In the conclusion, we finalize a discussion 
of the vices or benefits of forgetting and do so to answer those questions posed in the 
above pages.  
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Chapter One 
 
Episodic Memory and the Associative Process: The Sound and the Fury and As I Lay 
Dying 
 
 
 
Faulkner, in both As I Lay Dying and The Sound and the Fury, presents us with 
texts saturated by intricacies of the mind. Many critics view As I Lay Dying as a failed 
novel because of its representation of convoluted and interrupted time and its series of 
unreliable narrators, a view that I will argue misinterprets the complex structure and 
narration of this text. What some have come to see as “clairvoyant” and “disengaged”1 
narrations are, I wish to claim, presentations of the characters’ associative memories and 
their working imagination. This chapter will examine how Faulkner’s fiction represents 
the associative properties of human memory and how these properties, cast into their 
respective novels, consequently reinterpret this literature. We focus on these two works 
of Faulkner when considering associative memory; however, this does not mean that 
conclusions applied are to be made exclusively to these works and this author. There are, 
in fact, a great many authors who actively play on association.  The conclusions I offer 
can in many cases be easily adapted to a great number of other writings. My focus on 
Faulkner also does not imply that the principles concerning associative memory and the 
given readings are restricted to Faulkner. The case simply stands that Faulkner is one 
                                                
1 Such adjectives here refer to the literary speaker (character, narrator, etc.). The 
distinction must be made so as to not confuse the author as being “clairvoyant” or 
“disengaged”. Such criticisms only refer to the author’s creations rather than the authors 
themselves.  
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writer who wrote clearly and intentionally about the activities of the mind. For this 
purpose, I find him to be a prime example, on of memory, to use in such an analysis.  
The primary focus of this chapter will be to explain associative memory as it 
appears in Faulkner’s As I Lay Dying and The Sound and the Fury. It is important to note 
that a study of neuroaesthetics, particularly that dealing with literature, must contend with 
the duality that lies between the creator and the created. That is to say, that when 
examining the workings of the human mind through such works as those of Faulkner, we 
need to realize that we can look to the mind of the character to the extent that Faulkner 
allows, and we can also look into the mind of Faulkner himself. To elaborate further, we 
can study Faulkner’s Benjy to better understand how the mind associates with a disregard 
to temporal boundaries; however, we can also better understand that mind by considering 
that of Faulkner’s, and questioning what mental happenings led him to create the 
character and the mind of Benjy. This chapter will focus on the former, while still 
recognizing that a study of the mind of the author, in this case Faulkner, can produce 
similar results. A close study of literary works will of course be central in this portion, 
but we must apply neurobiological theories and concepts in order to elucidate literature’s 
own teachings about memory. We shall find when looking to understand literary minds 
that the mind remembers by associating.  
The associations among memories allows for later formed memories and acquired 
knowledge to compile upon an original memory. The question then becomes whether or 
not this process results in an entirely new memory or rather a transformed memory—the 
key distinction between the two being that the idea of a new memory implies that the 
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comparatively old2 still exists, whereas the transformed memory implies that the old 
memory does not. This section will argue that associative memories create the 
transformed memory. However, the new memory is not dismissed. There is a marked 
relationship between the associative memory and the imagined, and it is rather the 
imagination’s product that acts in this case as our new memory.  
In looking to association within the scheme of memory, we look to understand 
several very important sensations that affect human memory, the mind, and the aesthetics 
of the mind. By understanding association, we can come to a closer understanding of the 
basic ways in which our memories are organized. We can eventually come to understand 
how the mind distinguishes between what is “real” and what is not, and why it is that the 
mind will occasionally come to prefer that which is “unreal.” How the mind associates 
helps us to understand how the mind conceives of reality. Although perhaps more 
importantly, understanding memorial associations will lead us into a discussion of how 
the mind is socially conditioned to know what is “real” before it ever experiences the 
“real.” In examining association and applying conclusions of this examination to the 
works of Faulkner, I hope to show that the mind has a very set number of memories. That 
is to say, that past a certain point of mental development, the mind stops forming new 
memories and simply aggregates on and evolves a set of memories from childhood and 
early life. The final chapter will discuss these ideas of reality and the intentional 
confabulation of memories.  
When considering As I Lay Dying, Darl is the focus of any discussion about the 
mind’s associative properties because it is he who Faulkner creates to be an unusually 
                                                
2 The idea of the “old” memory is here synonyms with the original memory given by this 
example.  
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perceptive observer and, thus, a character who is fully aware and at the mercy of his 
memories. Additionally, Faulkner’s The Sound and the Fury presents an intensely caustic 
narrative that is told in part through a socially bitter voice. Faulkner’s Benjy, while 
perhaps one of the most obscure and complex narrative voices in literature, is revealing 
of the inner workings of the human mind.  Benjy provides the reader a profound and 
organic view of the relationship between the character’s perception of the world and his 
memories, both of which will lead us directly into seeing how the mind’s perception is 
guided by association. Benjy’s narration, while complex and seemingly deviate, marks 
critical points and nuances of his mental processes that elucidate the intricacies of the 
memory selection process. Memorial association will be a large focus of the Benjy 
character, as it arguably is in the novel.  
We find that Faulkner constructs the minds of his characters to associate, and he 
does so because he writes to mirror the organic workings of the human mind. From the 
very onset of the novel, Faulkner employs Darl to present the processes of associative 
memory. In the Darl section, the third section of the novel, Darl moves through various 
levels of memory state, and as Catherine Pattern claims, each shift is “prodded by 
external associations” (Pattern 13). At first, a sip of water returns Darl’s mind to its first 
realization that cedar water has a superior taste (As I Lay Dying 10-11). The cedar water 
then reminds him of drinking water at night, which reminds him of lying alone in the 
darkness during his childhood. Like Benjy, Darl processes and functions by associating. 
These two characters are not the only examples of Faulkner’s associating minds; 
however, they are two prime examples due to the attention that Faulkner pays to them. As 
two forms of protagonists, Faulkner details their minds and their associations in a way 
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that we really cannot find in other characters. For this reason, they are to be our most apt 
case studies.  
The narrative structures of both Faulknerian novels leave a stain of contention on 
our discussion. Devices such as narrating voice and form and verbiage tense and style are 
often times unconventional within Faulkner’s novels, sometimes to a point of preventing 
the reader’s comprehension. What we must realize is that such presentations by Faulkner 
do not mark failures, although many critics have argued otherwise. Stephen M. Ross 
offers an argument in regards to Faulkner’s uses of tense that I find appropriate, and one 
that will be of the utmost importance when we introduce the theory of duration. He 
argues that “the present tense suggests greater immediacy than does past, allowing 
Faulkner, merely by choosing one tense over another, to submerge a character more 
deeply into his experience, letting the reader then sense the character’s heightened 
psychic involvement” (Ross 35). This then suggests that Faulkner elects tense for the 
purpose of demonstrating the character’s mental involvement in his experience, rather 
than for the purpose of signifying temporal difference. Ross additionally concludes that 
“[w]ith past tense, Faulkner can move a character in a way that is simultaneously 
psychological and temporal, back from an event, permitting speculation on its meaning” 
(Ross 35). Particularly when reading Faulkner, we are conscious of the problematic 
nature of a “present.” Ross only further confirms that Faulkner’s use of the present tense 
does not necessarily match the conventional present. For Faulkner, the present rather 
signifies a mental state, the degree to which the mind is emotionally or metaphysically 
involved in the experience. Faulkner’s tenses thereby suggest the degree of mental 
detachment rather than the literal physical detachment to which we are accustomed.  
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 Because Faulkner gave many interviews about his thoughts on a myriad of topics, 
we do know a great deal about his stated intentions behind his work. I preface, then, this 
discussion of The Sound and the Fury with the following excerpt from a 1957 interview. 
While lengthy, the following passage touches upon many points that are critical to a 
proper reading of The Sound and the Fury. 
That was part of the failure. It seemed to me that the book approached nearer the 
dream if the groundwork of it was laid by the idiot, who was incapable of 
relevancy. That’s—I agree with you too, that’s a bad method, but to me it seemed 
the best way to do it, that I shifted those sections back and forth to see where they 
went best, but my final decision was that though that was not right, that was the 
best to do it, that was simply the groundwork of that story, as that idiot child saw 
it. He himself didn’t know what he was seeing. That the only thing that held him 
into any sort of reality, into the world at all, was the trust that he had for his sister, 
that he know that she loved him and would defend him, and so she was the whole 
world to him, and these things were flashed that were reflected on her as in a 
mirror. He didn’t know what they meant. (Faulkner in the University 63-64) 
Again, here are explanatory points to which we shall return in greater detail, but for the 
moment we can offer a basic understanding of what Faulkner was attempting in The 
Sound and the Fury. Like many critics, Faulkner considers Benjy to be his “idiot,” a term 
that we must look at only through the manner in which Faulkner defined it. To Faulkner, 
the idiot is an individual incapable of understanding the “why,” that is to say, he cannot 
comprehend the connections between experiences. This line tells us that “the only thing 
that held him into any sort of reality, into the world at all, was the trust that he had for his 
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sister.” Faulkner’s observation here is exceedingly important to our discussion of Benjy’s 
associative memories.  
Given the knowledge of neurobiology at the time that Faulkner was writing, we 
can reasonably assume that at the very least his writings of non-linear narration were not 
for the purpose of commenting on the memory’s associative properties. This account, it 
seems to me, is an important note in the analysis of Faulkner within the context of 
neuroaesthetics; for authorial intentionality should be a component of any analysis of 
literature. I think it first necessary to come to a conclusion about Faulkner’s purpose 
behind his inclusion of mental processes in his work and then discuss the validity of 
Benjy as a narrator. No one can say with certainty that Faulkner intended the reader to 
focus upon questions of the mind’s workings of memory in the context of reading Benjy, 
but we can still probably conclude that this was not his aim. However, the lack of 
authorial intentionality here does not disqualify Benjy as an excellent candidate by which 
to examine this phenomenon. We do, however, know from interviews with Faulkner that 
he did intend for Benjy to be an “idiot,” a term that to Faulkner implied a great deal of 
probing into the mind. 
 There is another supportive point to be made about Faulkner labeling Benjy an 
idiot. The inspiration for the novel’s title, The Sound and the Fury, of course comes from 
Shakespeare’s Macbeth, “Out, out, brief candle,Life’s but a walking shadow, A poor 
player/ That struts and frets his hour upon the stage/ And then is heard no more. It is a 
tale/ Told by an idiot, full of sound and fury,/ Signifying nothing” (Macbeth V.5). 
Arguably, the very last line, “It is a tale told by an idiot, full of sound and fury, signifying 
nothing,” mirrors Faulkner’s own spoken thoughts on Benjy. Through all of this, we 
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recognize that Faulkner did have knowledge of very basic, rudimentary neurobiological 
processes. Though neuroaesthetics was not an existing field of study during Faulkner’s 
time, we nevertheless find Faulkner to be interested in and asking questions concerning 
certain things that we might label as neurobiological. The fact that he wrote these 
ponderings into his fiction marks his novel as an early and prime example of a 
neuroaesthetically-minded work of literature.  
We look to the opening scene in The Sound and the Fury as a prime example of 
Faulkner’s incitation of associative memory. Benjy catches himself on a nail from the 
fence and doing so triggers a recollection from his distant childhood when his sister 
Caddy had to disentangle him from a fence. For the first page and a half of the novel 
Benjy is narrating in first person, which Faulkner’s chapter head labels as April Seventh, 
1928 at which time Benjy was thirty-three years of age. From the beginning, we are 
forced to question temporal states. Seemingly, we should consider this moment to be in 
the present time. However, we discover that Benjy is subtly narrating through memory— 
“Through the fence, between the curling flower spaces, I could see them hitting. They 
were coming toward where the flag was and I went along the fence” (The Sound and the 
Fury 3). A few lines later Benjy tells of Luster saying, “’Listen at you, now.’ Luster said. 
‘Aint you something, thirty three years old, going on that way’” (Faulkner 3). Knowing 
Benjy’s age is possibly more important than first treating it as an incidental mention. 
Thirty-three years places Benjy at his oldest age in the novel, yet his narration still 
indicates that this moment, which is clearly the most recent to the actual present, is in the 
past. Thus, this moment then marks the relative present of the Benjy section. Faulkner 
establishes this relative present at the very opening of The Sound and the Fury. In doing 
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so, he employs a type of narration that separates the teller from the story, the sort that 
creates both the point of narration and the point of action, respectively, being the point in 
time at which the story is narrated and then the point of the material that is narrated 
(Franklin 57). As readers, we enter the narration from the point of narration, for we really 
have no other way to enter. But in doing so, we are reading the story by means of recalled 
memories.  
A recalled memory is one that has experienced time, meaning that a recalled 
memory is very rarely in its original state. Before we turn to neurobiology for a better 
understanding of this point, we might first consider a personal note of A.S Byatt who in 
her introduction to her Memory anthology observes, “ I have a memory I think of as The 
Memory” (“Introduction” Memory: An Anthology xii). This Memory, we learn, is a 
moment in the East Hardwick Elementary School yard. The Memory is nothing special, 
but at the end of her telling, Byatt comments “I know I have added to this Memory every 
time I have thought about it, or brought it out to look at it. It has acquired notes of 
Paradise Lost, which I don’t think it had when I was five or six” (“Introduction” Memory: 
An Anthology xii). She accepts this memory to be relative in the face of time and space; 
that is to say, that the memory has changed due to spatial and temporal incursion. Byatt is 
conscious of this fact, but awareness does not prevent the alteration. This example from 
Byatt then demonstrates that continuing associations cue to the memory and redact its 
structure and information, thereby placing the memory in a dynamic state.  
Neurobiologically speaking, knowledge compiles upon preexisting memories, 
and to this point, the issues of memory recall and retrieval prove central. Eric Kandel 
writes “to be useful, a memory has to be recalled” (In Search of Memory: The Emergence 
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of a new Science of the Mind 215). The appropriate cues must be present in order for 
memory retrieval to take place. The cues can be external coming from sensitization, 
classical conditioning, and sensory stimulus in habituation; or they can be internal, 
generated by an idea or desire (In Search of Memory: The Emergence of a new Science of 
the Mind 215). The mind will then associate these particular cues with an already learned 
experience. The neurons that work to recall the memory are the same neurons (sensory 
and motor) that were first activated at the moment of the memory’s formation (In Search 
of Memory: The Emergence of a new Science of the Mind 215). The repetition, therefore, 
of intentional recall of entire experience and details from the experience helps the mind to 
form a long-term memory. When we find Darl repeating certain bits of narration in an 
almost neurotic way, what we rather see instead of insanity, is his mind working to instill 
the details and experience in memory. Because Darl is actively working to turn certain 
details into memory, we must read these details as being important to Darl.  However, 
ecphory, the pre-conscious process in which retrieval cues are brought into contact with 
stored information, can be variant. As Tulving explains, “A great deal of evidence exists 
showing that the correspondence between the original event or fact and its ecphorized 
form may be highly variable, from near-perfect reproduction to glaring discrepancies” 
(Tulving 6). We will return to this idea of the inherent unreliability of ecphory and 
expand upon it through an application to our literary texts. But we first note on a basic 
level that the very fact that a memory is recalled does not certify its faithfulness to its 
original form.   
There are several terms that need defining to carry out a neuroaesthetic discussion 
of association—we shall be defining these terms throughout as they become relevant to 
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our literary discussion. To begin, explicit memory is based on the conscious recall of 
factual knowledge and requires the medial temporal lobe and the hippocampus. Implicit 
memory, on the other hand, is the unconscious recall of motor and perceptual skills, and 
emotional responses. Implicit memory requires the amygdala, the striatum, and reflex 
pathways (The Age of Insight 308). Implicit memory is responsible for the beholder’s 
unconscious recall of empathy and emotion as a response to a subject or experience; 
whereas, explicit memory is responsible for the beholder’s conscious recall of the form 
and subject of the experience (Age of Insight 309). Kandel writes, “Regardless of whether 
an icon calls up a cultural or a personal meaning, the viewer’s conscious and unconscious 
recognition of that icon recruits one of the other or commonly both memory systems of 
the brain” (Age of Insight 309). These two memory systems, implicit and explicit 
memory, are the foundations for associative memory. Associative memory is strongly 
related to the idea of top-down processing, which is an approach to information 
processing where the mind breaks down the entire system in order to gain insight from its 
compositional parts. Top-down signals rely on memory for the purpose of comparing 
incoming visual information with prior experience (Age of Insight 306).3  
Encoding is the process that converts the event information into an engram, or the 
means by which memory traces are stored through either biophysical or biochemical 
changes in the brain (Tulving 6). Contrarily, ecphory is the process in which retrieval 
information determined by a cue, usually environmental, is correlated with the 
information of the engram (Tulving, Le Voi, Routh, Loftus 1). Encoding and engram 
                                                
3 The contrary to top-down processing is bottom-up processing, where information 
processed through low and intermediate level vision is integrated to give rise to a 
complex system; therefore, forming the system through its complex parts, thus making 
the original systems sub-system of the product (Age of Insight 306). 
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formation are the principal components of memory storage; whereas, ecphory and 
ecphoric information are the principal components of memory retrieval (Tulving 6). 
General abstract processing system (GAPS) depicts the stages of encoding, storage, and 
retrieval of memorial information. There are three different kinds of concepts that fall 
within GAPS: observable aspects, hypothetical processes, and hypothetical states, where 
the states represent the products of the process (Tulving 5). The central concepts of 
GAPS are those discussed above, encoding, engram, ecphory, and ecphoric information. 
The act of remembering begins with the encoding of perceived information from an event 
and ends with the creation of a cognitive state. This cognitive state is that of the ecphoric 
information and is constructed by both the engram and the retrieval cues (Tulving 6).  
Neurobiology and memorial studies have recycled through many different 
theories of appropriate classification schemes of human memory. The latest theory holds 
there to be five major systems of learning and memory: procedural memory, perceptual 
priming, short-term memory, semantic memory, and episodic memory (Tulving 11). 
Procedural memory encompasses skills and simple conditioning. The procedural system 
is an action system, meaning that it operations are expressed in behavior rather than 
cognition. The four other systems are cognitive systems, meaning that they mediate 
changes in mental processes or thought. The first of these systems, perceptual priming, is 
a form of learning that is found in the advanced identification of objects4. Short-term 
memory can also be referred to as primary memory or working memory. The process 
registers and retains information in an easily accessible form for a short period of time 
                                                
4 Perception of an objection at Time 1 stimulates the perception of the same object at 
Time 2 in the sense that at the point of Time 2, the identification of the object can take 
less time or less information than it does with the absence of priming (Tulving 13). 
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following input (Tulving 12). Semantic memory and episodic memory are to be our most 
important of these five systems in this part of our discussion, although episodic memory 
will really become our principle system of concern. Semantic memory is simply the 
general knowledge of the world. It provides the individual with the basic materials 
needed for thought; whereas, episodic memory allows the individual to remember 
moments of his past (Tulving 13). This memory system refers to the most complex 
system that emerges in early childhood. It requires both the individual’s self-awareness of 
having experienced a particular event and the contextual details that surround this event 
as well as the ability to recall this information at future points (Guillery-Girad B et al.., 
1). Episodic memory relies on the binding of different types of associations. These 
associations may be integrated into a single representation (Mayes et al.., 2007). 
Most experiences do not leave a trace in the mind; however, a few experiences are 
remarkable in that they alter the physical and chemical structure of the brain by forming 
new connections between neurons. These new neural connections are the basis of 
memories. Memories are only made from those experiences that excite prolonged or 
intense neural activity. Long-term memories are broken down into two categories, 
depending on the level of consciousness that is needed to recall the memory. Declarative 
or explicit memories include episodic memories and semantic memories and are 
consciously recalled by the brain. Procedural or implicit memories are the unconscious 
memories of “knowing how.” Procedural memories are composed of automatic 
sensorimotor behaviors that become so deeply embedded in the mind that we are unaware 
of them (Carter 158). The formation of any long-term memory occurs through an 
extensive process. At first, the brain needs to provide intense focus to one particular 
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experience—the thalamus and frontal lobe are charged with maintaining focus5. This 
attention causes the neurons responsible to fire more frequently. A higher frequency of 
neural firing intensifies the experience and increases the chances of the formation of a 
memory. The more a neuron fires, the stronger connections it is able to make with other 
neural cells (Carter 158).  
Moving back now to an application of these neurobiological ideas to literature, we 
find that throughout Benjy’s section there are cues that spur the jumps in memory. These 
cues are naturally occurring details found in reality that when perceived indicate to 
Benjy’s mind that it should shift back to a prior moment. We can think of these details as 
similarities between experiences. The experience of the “present” will trigger the mind to 
recognize a correlation to past experience, in turn bringing the mind’s focus to that 
particular memory. These details facilitate the process of assimilation. In Benjy’s mind 
these cues arguably originate from particular details found in the two memories that 
dictate his conceptual reality. Benjy’s earliest memory occurs when he is around the age 
of three, presumably in early fall of 1898 (Stewart and Backus 444). He along with the 
other Compson children are attempting to spy in on the brunch at Damuddy’s funeral. It 
is the following scene that is arguably the most significant in the formation of Benjy’s 
memory and reality: 
  ‘Push me up, Versh.’ Caddy said. 
                                                
5 The thalamus will maintain activity regarding target of attention. The frontal lobe keeps 
attention fixed on target by inhibiting distractions. Generally, the frontal lobe is 
responsible for thinking, making judgments, making decision, planning, and conscious 
emotion. The thalamus is a large mass of paired gray matter that is located between the 
brain stem and the cerebrum. It acts as the principle relay station for sensory information 
coming into the brain (Carter 246). 
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‘All right.’ Versh said. You the one going to get whipped. I ain’t.’ He 
went and pushed Caddy up into the tree to the first limb. We watched the 
muddy bottom of her drawers. The we couldn’t see her. We could hear the 
tree thrashing. 
  ‘Mr. Jason said if you break that tree he whip you.’ Versh said. 
  ‘I’m going to tell on her too.’ Jason said. 
  The tree quit thrashing. We looked up into the branches. 
  ‘What you seeing.’ Frony whispered. (The Sound and the Fury 39) 
Benjy’s near obsession with Caddy and the association that he makes between Caddy and 
trees are two imperative components of this memory. This description of the “trashing 
tree” is one that reappears throughout this scene and in moments of Benjy’s narration 
immediately before and after.  
Benjy associates Caddy with trees throughout the narrative of his memories. 
However, the above moment of the “thrashing tree” is uncharacteristically violent in 
comparison to the rest of Benjy’s mention of trees. The specific connotation implies that 
fear was present in Benjy’s emotional sphere during the original experience. The 
connotation, however, also conveys a sense of looming anguish and threat, which thereby 
introduces the application of emotional desire into our discussion of memory formation. 
The brain is most likely to create intensely emotional experiences into long-term 
memories because emotion increases attention. The emotional information from a 
stimulus is originally processed through an unconscious pathway that leads to the 
amygdala, a portion of the limbic system that is exclusively concerned with emotion. The 
amygdala instantly assesses incoming information for emotional relevance. The 
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hypothalamus modulates all activation of the amygdala (Carter 125). The memory of 
Damuddy’s funeral is inarguably a moment that forges an intense memory in Benjy’s 
mind. Benjy’s ability to recall this memory so readily and his obsession of remembering 
back to this moment signifies that the original experience created an intense response 
from Benjy’s amygdala; therefore, the moment must have contained stimuli that initiated 
an emotional reaction. 
Emotional intensity is a crucial part in the formation of many memories. Intense 
emotional experiences are more likely to become memories because high levels of 
emotion increase attention. Emotional information is initially processed through 
unconscious pathways that led to the amygdala6. The amygdala replays emotional 
experiences, and this replay then incites the encoding of memories. It is possible for some 
traumatic events to be permanently stored in the amygdala (Carter 158). If we consider 
this neuroaesthetic description in the context of Benjy, we find before us an intentionally 
created mind that functions with abnormal constraints. When asked what emotion Benjy 
inspired in him, Faulkner responded, “The only emotion I can have for Benjy is grief and 
pity for all mankind. You can’t feel anything for Benjy because he doesn’t feel anything” 
(Meriwether and Millgate 245). A lack of emotional response should diminish production 
of long-term memory. Diminishing, in terms of quantity, is difficult to measure with 
respect to Benjy; although, we can find that the amount of memories that Benjy’s mind 
retains is comparatively few. What is more important in the sense of diminished memory 
is the manner in which the mind utilizes the memories that it does hold to understand its 
                                                
6 The amygdala is located within the brain’s temporal lobe, and plays an important role in 
the limbic system. Principally, the amygdala is responsible for controlling emotion 
(Carter 242). 
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present and its reality. In Benjy we discover these normal mental processes to be 
inadequate relative to social demands.  
Most memories derive from events that are heavily saturated with sensory 
moments. Like other aspects of memory formation, the stronger the sensation, the more 
likely that it will be remembered. The formation of perceptions begins in the sensory 
cortices. It is now known that long-term memory is permanently stored in the cerebral 
cortex; more importantly, it is stored in the part of the cerebral cortex that originally 
processed the information. Memories of visual images are stored in the visual cortex and 
memories of tactile experiences are stored in the somatosensory cortex (In Search of 
Memory 129). All memories are stored in pieces, therefore, in order for the mind to recall 
a memory, the mind must engage different sections of the brain.  This indicates that 
memories, like the brain, are partitioned. 
 Working memory or short-term memory must exist before long-term memory. 
Working memory is “held in mind” by processes of repetition (Carter 159), and is 
believed to involve two neural circuits. Both circuits exist for the purpose of “keeping the 
memory alive” until it is either forgotten or turned into a long-term memory. One circuit 
provides visual and spatial information, and the other auditory. The circuits encompass 
the sensory cortices, where the experience is registered, and the frontal lobes, where it is 
consciously noted. The flow of information into and throughout these circuits is 
controlled by neurons that reside in the prefrontal cortex (Carter 159). Working memories 
that are special in nature travel to the hippocampus for further processing into long-term 
memory. The hippocampus then starts a process known as long-term potentiation for the 
purpose of permanently encoding the information from the experience. Long-term 
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potentiation involves the synchronous firing of neurons. Synchronous firing makes the 
neurons involved more inclined to fire again at later times. If the neurons fire together 
often, they eventually become sensitized to each other—if one fires, all the rest do as well 
(Carter 156). The process ensures and allows for memories to be recalled through 
association. For example, if Benjy’s visual cortex is stimulated upon seeing a nail at any 
given point, a neuron will fire to indicate the occurrence of this particular perception. The 
firing of this neuron, because it has links to other neurons, will incite the recall of the 
long-term memory of getting stuck under the fence.  
We now move from a discussion heavily focused on neurobiological concepts to 
one concerned with the temporal parameters of association. As briefly mentioned, 
Bergson’s theory of duration calls for the fluidity of time, a theory that questions the 
essence of a present. Our analysis must contend with the notion that the idea of the 
present is something that has come to a definition within the context of temporal duration 
and memory studies. Putting Faulkner in this context is necessary to understand his 
novelistic structure, and in general, serves any reading of his work. Faulkner greatly 
adheres to the idea of temporal fluidity, integrating the present and past. We see him do 
this principally through use of italics and sporadic changes in tense. To this point Ross 
writes, “he [Faulkner] alters verb tense for the same reasons he employs italics,…to 
suggest the infinite variability of human awareness” (Ross 35). Returning to the quoted 
passage from The Sound and the Fury, we can understand this “variability of human 
awareness” to signify the compounding nature of perception and mental processing. The 
mind’s realization of the similarities between a perceived detail of the “present” and that 
of the memory dictates the degree of awareness that the mind employs in the “present” by 
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preemptively ordering what details the mind is to look for in the given moment. That 
detail, when found, will cue a memorial association, enhance mental attention, and 
possibly lead to the creation of a long-term memory. Variability then speaks to the 
infinite ways in which the mind becomes structured by experience to recognize and 
process presents.  
As I Lay Dying is no exception to Faulkner’s unconventional novelistic structure. 
Here, as in The Sound and the Fury, several moments occur when the plot or even the 
narrator seems to jump from place to place in time and space with little conceivable 
reasoning. To this respect, in As I Lay Dying Pattern writes the following: 
Although Faulkner often uses past-tense narration in As I Lay Dying, he departs 
daringly from the traditional procedure by mixing his narrative modes. The book 
begins, in fact, with present-tense narration which continues for a significant 
portion of the novel…If, as in As I Lay Dying, the narrators are also participating 
in the actions they are describing, the reader plunges into a world of pure 
subjectivity; external chronological reality is revealed only through its 
impingement on the consciousness of the speaker. When only one narrator exists, 
such a story becomes a study of his mind; when many such narrations exist, the 
whole question of perception assumes paramount importance. (Pattern 3-4) 
Pattern provides what I believe to be a good overview of the novelistic structure. The 
novel begins, as Pattern describes, in present tense. As we move through the novel, we 
find that this voice changes in parts, thereby leading to the question once again of how 
Faulkner employs his use of tense. As already stated, Faulkner relies more on tense to 
show the mind’s relationship to the event rather than the narrator’s presence along a 
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temporal line. In these respects, Pattern introduces a good explanation: because the 
narrators are seemingly participating in what Faulkner has written as present tense, we 
are exposed only to the actions of the external world as they relate and are relevant to the 
mind of the narrator. Therefore, at any moment when we must interpret with 
consideration of conventional temporal states, we must understand that the temporal 
nature of the described is guided only by the structure of the narrator’s mind. Because of 
this, we cannot interpret time in Faulkner’s novels from our own understanding of 
temporal patterns. We have learned these patterns; thus, this indicates that they are 
unnatural. And so at a subconscious level where the individual mind is free to function 
without esoteric influence, we find very different identities of time. The conventional 
patterns, which we use consciously when analyzing fiction, are lost within the individual 
mental attempts to understand and convey its reality. 
Darl’s telling of his mother’s death is but a few pages long. The first few pages of 
the scene make it seem as if Darl is besides Addie’s deathbed. The scene then breaks to a 
change in setting, location, and literal appearance. Italics are by no means foreign to the 
works of Faulkner—The Sound in the Fury is saturated with such—and herein we find 
the first example of Faulkner’s italics in As I Lay Dying. At a very basic level, the italics 
signify a very strong shift in the narrative structure. It would be difficult to know how to 
assess Faulkner’s exact intention in his use the italics. We can, however, extract the 
details of the passage in order to offer a reasonable interpretation as to the significance in 
the break. The break comes right after, “’Durn them boys,’ he says” (Faulkner 49) as said 
by Anse in reaction to Darl and Jewel leaving to delivery wood right before the moment 
of their mother’s death. The break itself then comes in the form of the following: 
 33 
Jewel, I say. Overheard the day drives level and gray, hiding the sun by a flight of 
gray spears. In the rain the mules smoke a little, splashed yellow with mud, the off 
one clinging in sliding lunges to the side of the road above the ditch. The titled 
lumber gleams dull yellow, water-soaked and heavy as lead, tilted at a steep 
angle into the ditch above the broken wheel; about the shattered spokes and about 
Jewel’s ankles a runnel of yellow neither water nor earth swirls, curving with the 
yellow road neither of earth nor water, down the hill dissolving into a streaming 
mass of dark green neither of earth nor sky. Jewel, I say (49). 
We first analyze the details of this particular section before considering the significance 
of the section as a whole, for the details themselves will reveal much about the workings 
of Darl’s mind.  
There are three main categories to focus upon in this section: the repetition, 
including the same phrase to start and end the passage, the rhetoric of negation, and the 
included details. “Jewel, I say” at both the beginning and end of the section implies a 
cyclical element to the happenings in Darl’s mind. That is to say, whatever brought Darl 
to this break in narration remained at the end. The repeated details (yellow, earth, water) 
not only mark themselves as particularly important, but also implicate a cadence inherent 
to the moment, suggesting that the mind is in a rhythmic state of repeating the details of 
the event. The details themselves, as repetition shows, are important to the mind. They 
mark the mind’s work of associating and attempting to understand a reality of dynamic 
markers, markers that may appear physically the same time after time but do change in 
purpose with regards to their varying contexts. 
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The negation—“Jewel’s ankles a runnel of yellow neither water nor earth 
swirls…neither earth nor water”—suggests that Darl’s mind is trying to reach a 
conclusion about what it is observing. “Neither of earth nor sky” is a conclusion of what 
is not based off previous experience of what was. Meaning that Darl’s mind is and can 
only comprehend from the memories of what it already knows, what it has already 
experienced. Robert Hemenway writes,  
The rain and the wind are only experienced by Darl with the auditory sense, and 
thus the total reality of rain and wind must be created by correlating the 
experienced sound with the memory’s significations of those sounds, with the 
‘idea’ of rain and wind. The ‘shaping’ of the lumber that the wind and rain do, 
therefore, is a creation of the ‘was’ of Darl’s memory operating in the ‘is’ of his 
consciousness, and in a purely literal sense, the lumber ‘is not’. Yet it does exist 
because Darl has conceived of it, and he is left to ponder which is real: the idea of 
lumber or the lumber filled wagon. (Hemenway 137) 
Making sense of the present depends entirely on comprehensions of the past. The 
recognition of something that is “neither of earth nor sky” is based off of preconceived 
perceptions; without such, Darl would have no foundation on which to form ideas. As 
Hemenway states, the realization of the present state only exists from memory.  
The creation of a system of belief is necessary in the process of conceiving and 
understanding reality in one’s own context (Sorajjakool 155). This idea led psychologist 
and philosopher, Jean Piaget, to develop his theory of “operational thought.” By this 
theory, a person moves through two processes when seeking to understand, those being 
the process of assimilation and the process of accommodation.  Both processes describe 
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how individuals react and adapt to new information, and involve the process of taking the 
new information and fitting it into pre-existing cognitive designs. Assimilation occurs at 
the onset of a new experience. The mind will turn to previous experiences to comprehend 
the newly found experience. If the mind can find no associations between the new 
experience and all previous experiences, it will come to a point of cognitive 
disequilibrium. Cognitive disequilibrium forces the mind to then search for new 
knowledge. In this state of cognitive disequilibrium, the mind will turn to accommodation 
where it will alter pre-existing cognitive designs in order to fit the newly received 
information (Sorajjakool 155).  
The presence of the passage from As I Lay Dying is now an issue unto itself. Due 
to the stipulations of association, we need to regard this passage by what comes before 
and after it. Arguably, the very existence of the passage is dependent upon temporal 
associations, meaning that the immediate thought that Darl had before the moment of the 
passage stimulated the remembrance of the actual moment. There existed a detail from 
the first set of narration—the scene of his mother’s death—that Darl’s mind associated 
with a detail in the italicized scene. We must realize that for the mind to jump from one 
point to another implicates a disregard to normative temporal structure; the mind must 
find an obvious connection between the experience in question and a memory held in any 
combination of memory systems. To the mind, there must exist some sense of temporal 
structure despite an apparent absence to the reader. In this first italicized scene, Darl’s 
mind is seemingly engaging its implicit memory system. We conclude this because we 
see no obvious physical detail connecting the previous moment to the moment in italics. 
In his article, “The Metaphoricity of Memory in Faulkner’s As I Lay Dying”, Iorgos 
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Glanos talks about the manner in which Paul Ricouer “has repeatedly shown that what 
guides and produces a metaphorical statement is the presence of similitude, an act of 
remembering the similar in otherwise dissimilar” (Glanos 4). Glanos continues by 
invoking Ricoeur’s notion that “in metaphors of transport, then, movement and space are 
possible only as names of memory…” (Glanos 4). Darl’s narration does at times give a 
clear shift in temporal state from paragraph to paragraph, but when considering how the 
mind works, guided by memories to associate one detail in the present to another in the 
past, this Faulknerian presentation of “broken time” becomes the most accurate 
representation of the interior narrations of the human mind. That is, the manner in which 
the individual mind narrates its own perceptions in present time.  
Let us look to The Sound and the Fury to see how and why it is that Benjy’s 
character narrates in a seemingly confusing manner, for he is possibly one of Faulkner’s 
most renowned oddities. The following passage starts with the very opening scene of the 
novel, the moment at which Benjy is with Luster who is searching for his quarter. The 
scene then moves directly into a moment of Benjy crawling under a fence with his sister 
Caddy. The italics, identical to those used by Faulkner, mark the change in temporal 
moment.  
‘Wait a minute.’ Luster said. ‘You snagged on that nail again. Cant you 
never crawl through ere without snagging on that nail.’ 
Caddy uncaught me and we crawled through. Uncle Maury said to not let 
anybody see us, so we better stoop over, Caddy said. Stoop over, Benjy. Like this, 
see. We stooped over and crossed the garden, where the flowers rasped and 
rattled against us. The ground was hard. We climbed the fence, where the pigs 
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were grunting and snuffing. I expect they’re sorry because one of them got killed 
today, Caddy said. The ground was hard, churned and knotted. Keep your hands 
in your pockets, Caddy said. Or they’ll get froze. You don’t want your hands froze 
on Christmas do you. 
‘It’s too cold out there.’ Versh said. ‘ You don’t want to go out doors.’ (The 
Sound and the Fury 2) 
The nail moves us, as readers of Benjy’s narration, to the “present” back to the past 
moment, or memory, of crawling under the fence with Caddy. We understand this form 
of narration can challenge many readers; still, this form of narration is a very clear 
example of the mind juxtaposing these temporal moments, which implies that it is very 
close to the natural manner in which the human mind functions. Questioning why it does 
so, we discover that the mind returns to memories to enhance a general understanding. 
This juxtaposition by the mind is what is known as memorial association, the process by 
which the mind relates observed details of the “present,” most often due to believed 
similarity or sameness between memorial details. In doing so, the mind not only brings 
together the details of the memory and the moment of the “present” but the memory and 
the moment in their entireties.  
 Benjy is fully aware of his environment in this opening scene. He gives no 
interpretation on what he reports, but this is intentional on Faulkner’s part in his effort to 
write Benjy as an idiot. Despite this intent, his style is clearly particular and is a style 
fitted in obsession. Repeated details are the structural foundation for this passage, as they 
are for most. When Benjy is not recanting the words of another person, he fixates. “The 
ground was hard,” Benjy “stooped over,” “Caddy said,” “Caddy said,” “Caddy said.” 
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Neurobiologists now recognize that repetition of memorial details, even after the point of 
memory formation, fortify the memory. The mind can accomplish this either consciously 
or unconsciously, and this might stand as one explanation for Benjy’s obsessive nature. 
However, what I find to be the more plausible explanation for this nature is the claim that 
Benjy’s mind seeks out certain details, such as Caddy’s presence or a muddy ground, 
rather than simply perceiving these details. That is to say, that Benjy’s mind is grounded 
in a set of details, and it understands by virtue of this set of details. These details allow 
his mind to associate, and without them he becomes completely lost.  
 Arthur Kinney argues that Benjy’s consciousness is fastened to two primary 
groups: those details that represent Caddy or accompany her—rain, trees, slippers, fire 
and mud or earth—and those that deal with loss or death (Kinney 142). Kinney’s 
argument is extraordinarily well founded and supported by the text. Chapter Three will 
examine how Caddy represents comfort for Benjy, and how both she and this sense of 
loss developed in his childhood and ultimately defined the rest of his life. Benjy’s 
attempts and successes to communicate parallel his development and Caddy’s presence. 
Hence, one of Benjy’s saddest moments follows Caddy’s marrying and leaving the house. 
With her gone Benjy wants to communicate with the schoolgirls, presumably in hopes 
that they would serve as Caddy’s replacements: 
They came on. I opened the gate and they stopped, turning. I was trying to say, 
and I caught her, trying to say, and she screamed and I was trying to say and 
trying and the bright shapes began to stop and I tried to get out. I tried to get it off 
of my face, but the bright shapes were going again. They were going up the hill to 
where it fell away and I tried to cry. But when I breathed in, I could breathe out 
 39 
again to cry, and I tried to keep from falling off the hill and I fell off the hill into 
the bright, whirling shapes. (The Sound and the Fury 53) 
This passage is shrouded in “trying”—“I was trying to say,” “I tried to get out,” “I tried 
to cry.” The “trying” continues until he completely falls, falls off “into the bright, 
whirling shapes.” Reality without authentic associative markers does not work and does 
not make sense. Benjy’s fall simply demonstrates that trying to confuse the mind in 
regards to what is “real” and the significance of its associative cues with synthetic 
markers just throws it into a hollow abyss. That is to say, Benjy is in a constant state of 
assimilation. His basis of reality is stationed in his childhood, which results in him having 
only a very few memories that he uses for assimilation. 
 Pattern also points to the fact that we must contend with Faulkner’s multiplicity of 
narrators in As I Lay Dying. She contends that a structure with multiple narrators muddles 
truth through the variability of perceptions that the narrators present. “Truth” becomes 
obscure, and as we shall eventually come to discuss, this elicitation by multiple voices 
parallels the ambiguity of reality. In reference to the issue of multiple narrators in As I 
Lay Dying, R.W. Franklin argues the following, “Only a point of action exists since there 
is no narrator per se. Each of the minds is its own persona telling its part of the story 
through unconscious, involuntary narration” (Franklin 5). Franklin seems to argue that a 
myriad of narrators discounts the individual narrator. Perhaps Franklin wants to call upon 
the issues that arise when forming an image of a reality in which a multitude of narrators 
exists. Issues surely do present themselves due to the variance of shared interpretation of 
the same experience. The fact of the matter is that the varying accounts do little more 
than place a greater responsibility on the reader to be cognizant of the novelistic form. 
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The reader must be aware that an inherent variability occurs throughout this structure. 
But Ross, as we cited earlier, would claim this simply mirrors the nature of the human 
variability of awareness. Franklin also claims that the narrator tells his story through 
“unconscious, involuntary” narration, and is not entirely incorrect. We earlier introduced 
the notions of explicit versus implicit memory. These terms are once again important in 
attempting to explain the idea of unconscious memories.  
To say that the narrator tells the story through “unconscious, involuntary 
narration,” Franklin assumes that the narrator is associating back to his implicit memory. 
But if this were the case, the narrator would rely only on emotional responses. We know 
that a great deal of the associations made by the narrators are stimulated by physical, 
environmental factors, thereby making the associations both conscious and unconscious 
on the part of the narrator. We already saw an example of conscious explicit recall by 
Benjy in the opening scene of The Sound and the Fury. It was the visual stimulate of 
getting caught on the nail that brought Benjy back to the moment with Caddy under the 
fence. But Benjy is the special case that forces us to question the interactions of his 
implicit and explicit memory systems. From the example of Benjy remembering and 
associating to the moment of getting caught under the fence with Caddy, it is difficult to 
see any evidence of his implicit memory system at work; however, at other moments in 
his narration, we can characterize his implicit system to be abnormally dominated.  
Memorial associations are directly related to temporal theories, which is to say 
that to best understand how details of perception are able to cause the mind to jump from 
seemingly present moment experience to a past existing only in memory, we need to 
understand how these moments of time—past, present, future—exist and work together. I 
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think it necessary to consider Bergson’s Theory of Duration, for this is the theory to 
which Faulkner himself subscribed. We know that Faulkner was familiar with Bergson’s 
work— he recommended to Joan Williams Bergson’s Creative Evolution (Pryse 15). In a 
later interview with a doctoral candidate at Princeton, Faulkner noted his agreement with 
Bergson’s theory of the fluidity of time—“There is only the present moment, in which I 
include both the past and the future, and that is eternity” (Blotner 563). In Creative 
Evolution, Bergson argues that the past remains present to us because of what he calls 
“duration” a process that he describes as “the prolongation of the past into the present” 
(Bergson 20), or what otherwise be known simply as memory. Bergson writes that our 
character is in effect the “condensation of the history that we have lived from our birth” 
(Bergson 7). Despite the fact that most of one’s memories are inaccessible to the 
consciousness, the ruling mind is developed and defined by all memories.  
 According to Bergson’s theory, all memories, even those of the subconscious, are 
inescapable and influential. Time is therefore fluid because the mind does not segregate 
memories by temporal markers. Rather, it aggregates all memories for the purpose of 
continual learning. In order for the mind to make sense of all temporal states (past, 
present, and future), memories must carry across yesterday and tomorrow. That is to say, 
all memories exist collectively in the mind as a dynamic center that drives understanding. 
Ross states the following, which I find to be a good summation of Bergson’s idea and its 
connection to As I Lay Dying. 
It is Bergson’s conception of “pure duration,” not linear, mechanical time…that 
guides Faulkner’s choice and experiments in As I Lay Dying. Duration is the 
temporal dimension all experience has, but this dimension cannot always be 
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represented as linear progression, for time is not always felt as sequence; time, 
like other dimensions of our awareness, varies infinitely, and intertwines itself 
with all other qualities of experience—with gradations in emotional intensity, 
with our sense of proximity of detachment, with our sense of stasis or change. 
(Ross 40) 
The theory of duration, and aesthetic examples that abide by the theory of duration, allow 
for the juxtaposition of two temporal moments. By juxtaposing, the mind forces itself to 
ruminate upon the nuances of each temporal moment, and in doing so, these nuances, the 
memorial details, return to a seat of examination, thereby starting a process of 
reevaluation. When the mind returns again to these two sets of memorial details, it once 
again assesses the significance of the details, but this time with an evolved context of its 
worldly cognition.  
This phenomenon of Benjy’s narration clearly marks Faulkner’s thoughts on time, 
particularly as related to Bergson’s theories. In 1952 Faulkner gave an interview to a 
French graduate student, Loïc Bouvard, and Bouvard wrote the following: 
Since we brought up Bergson, I next asked Faulkner to explain his conception of 
time. “There isn’t any time, he replied. “In fact I agree pretty much with 
Bergson’s theory of the fluidity of time. There is only the present moment, in 
which I include both the past and the future, and that is eternity. In my opinion 
time can be shaped quite a bit by the artist; after all, man is never time’s slave.” 
(Meriwether 70) 
To believe that time is fluid would implicate memories as responsible for defining 
experience regardless of time. Therefore, understanding is highly associative with the 
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past defining the future and the future defining the past. Understanding, like time, is 
continuous and evolutionary. If the present moment includes the past and the future, then 
collective understanding creates all moments, which is to say that the mind’s learning is 
continuously restructured. We will later come to question whether or not this 
restructuring falls within these parameters.  
 Lawrence Bowling argues that the Benjy character’s “escapes from the present” 
are a “mechanical function of the mind” (Bowling 554). Benjy’s narration clearly 
indicates that his mind will jump from the past back to the present for just long enough to 
experience another moment of association to return him to another memory. Though the 
narrative form in The Sound and the Fury appears to the reader to be haphazard, the 
mental processes of the characters in fact dictate the order. Roggenbuck argues that Benjy 
is more fascinated with relating details of his present with memories from his past 
(Roggenbuck 581). More importantly, Roggenbuck argues that Benjy’s detachment from 
his current reality “says more about his diminished interest in his current existence than is 
does about the limits of his cognitive abilities” (Roggenbuck 582). Faulkner’s intent was 
for Benjy to be incapable of accepting the future, 
There was Dilsey to be the future, to stand above the fallen ruins of the family 
like a ruined chimney, gaunt, patient and indomitable; and Benjy to be the past. 
He had to be an idiot so that, like Dilsey, he could be impervious to the future, 
though unlike her by refusing to accept it at all. (Roggenbuck 582) 
Faulkner possessed Benjy with the power to choose his focus of thought and delineate 
between various stimuli on which to reside his attention. Benjy simply chooses to ignore 
the future. Seeing his present by eliciting recollection captivates him. Surely, Benjy does 
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engage with his past at an extraordinary frequency because his present can only exist if 
related to the past.   
But what is the “present” in a Bergsonian scheme? Up to this point, we have 
talked about time’s fluid nature, insisting that the present, past, and future are all 
connected and dependent upon one another. The “present” moment is, however, the 
central point from which we consider memory. Although time is certainly relative to the 
subconscious of the mind, we only know to discuss our world through temporal labels. 
Benjy exemplifies how we are to understand the conceptual present in our discussion of 
memory. The sections dealing with Benjy’s thirty-third birthday on April 7, 1928, the 
point at which we begin in the novel, compose Benjy’s most recent present. It would be 
difficult and baseless to argue that Benjy’s “present” actually lies far ahead in the future. 
Perhaps it does, but the structure and analysis of the novel matters little upon this 
difference and to say that this moment of April 7, 1928 marks Benjy’s, at least, relative 
present is sufficient. A detailed reading of the Benjy section shows April 7, 1928 to be 
the moment that writes all other moments in either the past or the future, for this is the 
moment from which Benjy associates. Roggenbuck argues that Benjy has little 
involvement with his present, proposing that his “interests lie primarily in previous 
presents” (Roggenbuck 581). It is this captivation that illuminates this all-important 
relationship between Benjy’s conceptual reality and his memories. 
Perhaps we initially read Benjy to be consciously bringing his present experience 
back to his memory in examples such as looking for Luster’s quarter to getting stuck 
under a fence with Caddy. But the idea of fluidity suggests that time connects both 
backwards (present experience to memory) and forwards (memory to present 
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experience). And so following the notion of time’s fluidity, we need to question why 
Benjy bothered to start his present narration at the very moment that he did, for in doing 
so, he clearly marks this experience as a critical inhabitant of his mind. We must ask why 
it is that this moment so important. Surely, for this moment to be important there must be 
a reason rooted in the mind’s history. Following Ross, by the idea that human awareness 
is variable, the memory of the nail could have very well required the mind to collect 
further memories in which nails were prominent details. The variability of awareness, 
therefore suggests that the mind does not perceive or remember every detail and every 
experience. What it rather retains is that which supports an already formed notion of 
reality; what the mind is aware of is dependent upon what the mind needs to perceive.  
Critics have argued that the Bergsonian concept of duration seems to describe the 
stream-of-consciousness narrative style of Quentin in The Sound and the Fury, taking the 
narrative style of Quentin as evidence of Bergon’s influence on Faulkner. The Benjy 
section, then, is Faulkner’s attempt to envision an existence “composed of separate states 
with an impassive ego to unite them” (Guerlac 63). André Bleikasten writes that the 
Benjy section attempts to reveal the “vertical order” in which the “horizontal linearity of 
external chronology is replaced by a synchronic patterning of internal relationships” 
(Bleikson 15). Essentially, we read Benjy to be Faulkner’s intentional probing of duration 
by presenting “what would be” in the reverse. Benjy occupies a “predurational space,” or 
a space marked by textual duration rather than the duration of human consciousness 
(Pryse 17). By presenting this, Faulkner shows his reader what consciousness would look 
like if the human mind had the capability to separate memories from “present” 
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experience; Benjy’s mind is one that is unable to perceive the “endless flow” (Pryse 19) 
of his memory states.  
Benjy is an excellent example of Faulkner’s belief in the fluidity of time. It is, 
however, an example that only fortifies the concept of the fluidity of time by means of 
questioning a varying temporal reality. In a 1955 interview as part of his visit to Japan, 
Faulkner discussed the idiot’s view of time. Rather than being able to view the present, 
past, and future as a collective moment of understanding, Faulkner’s idiot lacks the 
ability to recognize continuation. The idiot finds time simply to be an instant void of any 
markers of “when”: 
To that idiot, time was not a continuation, it was an instant, there was no 
yesterday and no tomorrow, it all is this moment, it all is [now] to him. He cannot 
distinguish between what was last year and what will be tomorrow, he doesn’t 
know whether he dreamed it, or saw it. (Meriwether 147-148) 
Benjy can still associate, in fact, Benjy’s mind really only works through association, but 
his associations do not result in normal learning. This then indicates that the mind does 
need some temporal standards, however basic, to properly associate. Meaning, that the 
mind needs to be aware of the relativity of moments. It needs to see the present as the 
present and the past as the past. Perhaps this is because we cannot escape social context, a 
forcible constructor of our minds that holds heavily to temporal division. Association is 
purposed to further understanding, making sense of the past and the present and the 
future based off of an experience from a different temporal space. Benjy is able to make 
connections from instant to instant, but according to Faulkner, his mind does so without 
knowing why and without understanding the connections between moments. The failure 
 47 
to understand where the connections between the associated memories originate prevents 
Benjy’s learning.  
To this idea, Suzanne Nalbantian argues that, “It would seem that Faulkner 
creates the mentally retarded character Benjy in order to depict an uncontrolled intrusion 
of memory which completely breaks down rational barriers between the present and the 
past” (Nalbantian 93). I find her interpretation to be well-founded.  What she calls 
“rational barriers between the present and the past” we might rightly consider to be the 
connections between associated memories. Seemingly, the rationality lies in obvious 
temporal markers that define moments as past or present. The memory intrusion is simply 
uncontrolled because Benjy cannot recognize when it is appropriate to relate his present 
to memory because he cannot recognize the difference between a memory and a present 
moment.  
Finally, Franklin addresses time in As I Lay Dying and writes, “In As I Lay Dying 
Faulkner set up an extremely difficult narrative arrangement. The fictive present is also 
the immediate present, and there is no other upon which to rely” (Franklin 60). He then 
claims, “Obviously, events cannot be alluded to until they happen, and they cannot be 
lived again, yet both phenomena occur in As I Lay Dying” (Franklin 60). But Franklin 
reads with the fallacy of not understanding the time in which Faulkner writes. By that I 
mean to suggest that Franklin appears to be entirely ignorant of Faulkner’s subscription 
to the theory of duration. He does not realize that Faulkner writes from within the mind 
of the narrator. Within the mind, time is lived over and over again in memory. In the 
midst of memory recall, the present moment is entirely relative to the memory at hand. 
Therefore, it is reasonable for one to allude to events that have “not yet happened.” What 
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Franklin does not consider is that the mind, just as Faulkner embodies it, does not operate 
on the same temporal frame as the external world because the mind operates from 
memory. We, therefore, have two distinct levels of time: the temporal sense of the mind 
and the temporal sense that we as readers have as active participants within the external 
world of the mind or the collective world, each of which performs within its own charges. 
We cannot apply the principles of time used by the external world to the sense of time 
that exists within the mind, and vice versa. This, however, is just what Franklin does in 
his reading. What we discover through the study of literary association is that the mind 
does in fact need a basic sense of time to function within the parameters of an established 
collective reality.  
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Chapter Two 
 
 
 
Imagination, Conventional Language, and Processing Reality:  Speak 
Memory, “That in Aleppo Once,” To The Lighthouse 
 
 
“But there is no Shakespeare, there is no Beethoven; certainly and emphatically there is 
no God; we are words; we are the music; we are the thing itself.” 
—Virginia Woolf, “A Sketch of the Past” 
  
 
The Imagination and Reality 
 
Franklin cites the utterance of Addie’s final words as an example of his point of 
contention, saying: “Addie’s final words are uttered at the end of section eleven (Peabody 
370). They are given again in section twelve (Darl 371) after half a page of elapsed time 
has be relieved as a present” (Franklin 60-61). The final words of Peabody’s section 
eleven are as follows: “I leave the room. Beyond the porch Cash’s saw snores steadily 
into the board. A minute later she calls his name, her voice harsh and strong. ‘Cash,” she 
says; ‘you, Cash!’” (As I Lay Dying 46) Faulkner rewrites almost the same line a few 
pages later, this time through Darl’s voice: “’You Cash,’ she shouts, her voice harsh, 
strong, and unimpaired. ‘You, Cash!’” (As I Lay Dying 48) The only difference between 
these two lines is the addition of “unimpaired.” The addition suggests something rather 
special that Franklin never mentions, which we shall come to through the following 
observation: despite his realistic narrative style, Darl was not present at his mother’s 
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death. What, then, makes Darl able to give an account as if he were in the room for this 
mother’s last breath? Additionally, what does his absence suggest about the inclusion of 
“unimpaired”? By definition, “unimpaired” is quite synonymous with the other two 
preceding adjectives, but in this context, it implies something that the other two words do 
not. Peabody was present at the moment of Addie’s death, and thus we can safely assume 
that he heard her last words himself. Darl on the other hand, can only hear his mother’s 
words through hearsay and his imagination. “Harsh, strong, and unimpaired,” describe 
the manner in which Darl’s ears supposedly perceived his mother’s voice. These are 
subjective adjectives, meaning that they depend upon the beholder of Addie’s voice. Darl 
never heard these words; “Harsh, strong, and unimpaired” are, therefore, describing the 
degree of strength that Darl hears these imagined words. Compared to Peabody’s 
experience with Addie’s last words, “unimpaired” suggests that there is nothing in Darl’s 
mind impeding his image of his mother’s last moments. His emotional mind has painted 
the image well 
I begin our second chapter with the continuation of our discussion of As I Lay 
Dying to demonstrate the direct connection, yet apparent differences between memories 
and the imagination. As we saw in the previous chapter, the process of association creates 
an aggregate effect within the mind. It may appear as if the mind is continuously creating 
new memories, but it is rather compiling new information with past information to 
produce a transformed memory. In this chapter, we discuss the evolution from memory to 
imagination and the socially imprinted issues, being conventional language, surrounding 
imagination. Ultimately, we shall come to discover that unlike thoughts resulting from 
associations, the imagined represents a new memory, or at least comparatively so. By new 
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memory what I really intend to suggest is that unlike memories formed by association, 
memories dependent upon the fluidity of time, the imagination is the result of the mind 
piecing together bits of maintained memories. Association changes the nuances of 
memory for the purpose of appeasing the reality of the relatively present moment. 
Principles of association transform original memories to adapt to the dynamic temporal 
context, making time critical to associative memories. We will start with time in the 
context of the imagination, and by doing so, find that it is still important but in a manner 
very distinct from that of association.  
This chapter questions what happens when the mind refuses the stipulations of 
association, when rather than attempting to understand through the accumulation of 
similar memorial details, the mind ignores correlation. Memory works by associating to 
the past, compiling aspects of a new experience with memorial details. These details help 
to make sense of the “present” experience, and indicate which aspects of the present 
experience are important for the mind to remember. But what happens when these 
associations do not occur? Does memory exist at all, and if so, what form is it in? 
Memory does exist in the absence of association; however, it ceases to form in new. 
What rather materializes is the imagination, the portion of the mind that disregards 
association for the sake of learning through a medium void of esoteric influence.  
Vladimir Nabokov in this chapter is our primary example of the imaginative 
presence in literature, and we analyze such works as Speak, Memory and “That in Aleppo 
Once….” Later we turn to writers such as Virginia Woolf and Meena Alexander to see 
literature’s imagination as an artistic form that is cathartic for the mind. A discussion of 
these two women will reveal the necessity of imagination over simple association, 
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following Nabokov’s proclamation that the imagination dies in most minds after 
childhood. Before turning to these authors, I would like to start once again with Faulkner 
and his critics who will place in context and further elaborate upon the connection 
between associative memory and imagination.  
Lewis Leary is that critic for us to gain insight into the affair of memory and 
imagination. Leary claimed that much of Faulkner is “determined by memories or 
traditions of a past from which his outlook and activities derive” (Leary 3). Whether or 
not we accept this statement as true, the claim is obviously pertinent to this discussion. 
Superficially, this comment may appear to have little to do with the imagination, and 
perhaps Leary in no way intended it to be, but we shall come to find in further analysis of 
this quotation that not everything we believe to be memory truly is. In questioning what 
is memory, we reveal the qualifications for differentiation, and finally a definition of 
memory’s antithesis. But to start, I believe it necessary to go through Leary’s entire 
argument of the spectrum of Faulkner’s memories: he states that Faulkner believed there 
to be four different versions of the past, and a definition of all four would best precede 
any in-depth analysis of his works. There is first the mythical past that is handed down by 
scripture and folk memory. This describes a time when the world was young and 
primitive, an edenic time before man spoiled the world with his disobedience. Next 
comes the real past, which is simply that of historical events. The real past is followed 
by the legendary past, the third version that encompasses memories handed down “from 
father to son.” Whether or not those “legendary past” memories actually occurred, they 
are so believed to have happened that they come to form a sort of tradition (Leary 3). The 
last and fourth is the remembered past that describes all that every individual has lived 
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through—all that one knows, for having lived through it and having had consciousness of 
the experience, which certifies its existence (Leary 4). 
If we assume Leary to be correct and Faulkner did have a notion of four distinct 
types of memory, then there are several implications with which we must contend. First 
and foremost, Leary points to Faulkner as simply having memorial ideas. He additionally 
emphasizes ideas of collective and social memories. However, according to Leary, 
memories for Faulkner do not necessarily derive from actual experience. That is to say, 
that supposedly the truth of the memory is not definitional to the memory itself. Be this 
true, memories then have a sort of reliance on a belief state as suggested by the fact that 
false accounts have the possibility of being claimed as remembered “truths.” Therefore, 
the providence of memory does not rely on truth, at least not a literal truth though 
perhaps a believed truth. From these ideas we realize that Faulkner is expressing an early 
idea of what we have come to call social construction. We also come to see an important 
notion from these classified memories in mythic memory. Leary writes of a Faulkner who 
was fully accepting of memories that came from a place of ambiguity. That is to say, the 
validity of such mythic memories could never be proven, but we nonetheless hold them 
to be authentic memories.  
 These distinctions force us to question what is “real” in the realm of the 
remembered; although, before reaching that point we need to first consider how it is that 
the mind remembers the possibly “unreal.” The mind can either intentionally or 
unintentionally create false memories; however, intentional or not, both lines of 
confabulation imply that an original memory once stood as “true.” We need to be careful 
here with words such as “true” and “false” because in the context of memory what is 
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“true” and what is not is entirely subjective. Memories are created from a basis of how 
the mind perceives a moment or experience. Details are the units of perception that allow 
the brain properly to store the gathered information. No two people are ever going to 
remember the same moment in the same way because no two people will ever have the 
same experience with that moment, and no two people will ever perceive the exact same 
set of details. Therefore, the memory stored in their mind of that moment will differ if 
only ever so slightly. Let’s take the image of da Vinci’s Mona Lisa. Three people may 
spend one minute standing in front of the painting, studying what they believe to be every 
detail. After they walk away, we could ask them to speak of their memory of the painting. 
One man may tell us that in the foreground there was a woman smiling without showing 
her teeth. Another man may tell us that the woman had a cloak draped over her left 
shoulder. And the last man may tell us that behind the woman ran a river. Now, no man is 
wrong but very clearly each subject shares a very different memory of what he saw. This 
same result will occur every time that we perform such a task. For reasons that we will 
come to discuss, the human mind and the human brain are very individualized entities. 
We, therefore, need to be very careful about terms of truth when talking about bodies that 
collectively define conventional truth.  
 As I stated in the previous paragraph, a confabulated memory, or a falsified 
memory, regardless of the reason for it being so, implies that the process took an original 
memory and transformed it into a new memory in order to replace the old. There is 
another option for a sort of intentional falsification that purposely morphs multiple 
original memories into a singular product of the mind, this being imagination. In some 
instances, there is a very thin line between an imagined image and a confabulated 
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memory. The distinction, however, is critical to make for we cannot have a complete 
analysis of memory without considering the imagination. All that is imagined originates 
from memory. That which is imagined is the result of the mind’s conscious and 
intentional manipulation of a multitude of memories. To best understand the imagined 
and its workings and relations to memory, I would like to start here with the line between 
confabulated memories and the imagined. Leary spoke of the legendary past, which as he 
defines it is any memory without conceivable origin. The legendary past claims there to 
be memories that we simply believe to be “true” rather than being able to point to the 
moment in time from where the actual memory came. If we cannot find the memory in 
our own existence, how can we really know the memory to be a memory? Leary speaks 
of tradition in his definition of the legendary past. Tradition implies the memory to have 
come from a line of narrative retellings. While the current holders of the memory may 
stand centuries away from the source, the nuances of the memory from the legendary 
past promise actual existence of the source. And so while the current memory that comes 
from the legendary past may be substantially transformed from its original state, its 
provenance does still define its place as a memory.  
 These ideas about an inherent tradition in the legendary past speak a great deal to 
the ideas of shared memory and common memory. Tradition connotes a sense of history, 
the compilation of time’s happenings upon one another, a sense that is the foundation of 
shared and common memories. Avishai Margalit defines common memory as an 
“aggregate notion.” By this he means that the common memory “aggregates the 
memories of all those people who remember a certain episode which each of them 
experienced individually” (Margalit 51). An episode of common memory can also occur 
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when a given population of people have a rate of remembrance of a certain moment that 
is an overwhelming majority (Margalit 51). A shared memory is different in the respect 
that individual memories are not compiled. A shared memory “requires communication. 
A shared memory integrates and calibrates the different perspectives of those who 
remember the episode” (Margalit 51). These notions will become far more important 
when we begin our conversation of social construction, the formation of memory, and the 
place of reality in Chapter Three, but I think it here important to introduce these terms 
due to their relation to the idea of the legendary past. We can see that these examples of 
shared and common memories, which have the possibility of exemplifying Leary’s 
legendary past, derive from memory. While it may be a collection of memories, the 
important distinction to be made here that differentiates these things of shared and 
common memories and the products of the legendary past from an imagined item is that 
each began from one explicit memory, and if we were to look back far enough, we would 
be able to find the source of this memory. The question is what sort of memory is this 
memory from the legendary past? Because time prevents confirmation of the memory’s 
validity, we must say that this memory is falsified to some extent. However, one who 
possesses a memory from the legendary past will not see it to be false. This is because 
that memory from the legendary past and the collective and shared memories are 
engrained in the teachings of society. One then learns this “memory,” possibly adapts it 
to his own mind, and is unconscious of its false nature. This unconscious aspect further 
distinguishes this collectively confabulated memory from a product of the imagination. 
With memories from such origins as the legendary past, we must realize that not only are 
there multiple sources, but that the intentional purpose of the cohesion of these sources is 
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to create something unreal. I here mean to refer to any aspect of the collective reality, the 
sphere and power that teaches these collective and shared memories to the individual 
mind, that is “unreal” or unfounded in experience. We shall discuss the false collective 
reality further in Chapter Three, but for now it is important to know that the collective 
sphere will often support confabulated memories to protect the collective reality image.  
With what I believe to be an adequate context for imagination within the 
discussion of memory now settled, I turn to Nabokov, starting with his short story, “That 
in Aleppo Once.…” This is a seemingly strange narrative of a man who is writing a letter 
to a friend to tell the story of divorcing his wife. The man is on his honeymoon with his 
wife when he gets off of a train at a rest stop. When he returns, he discovers that the train 
has left without him. He then must search out his wife, eventually locating her only to 
realize that she has left him for another man. His story deteriorates until he reiterates the 
statement that he made at the very beginning of his letter, “I am positive now that my 
wife never existed. You may know her name from some other source, but that does not 
matter: it is the name of an illusion” (“That in Aleppo Once…” 241)7. This story is far 
more complex than it may perhaps seem, and I believe this complexity to lie in 
Nabokov’s provocations of memory, beginning principally with association and then 
leading into the imagination.  
 We have already called attention to the narrator’s claim in the beginning of this 
short story that his wife “never existed.” Basing a story on a wife that “never existed” 
perhaps calls into question the narrator’s sanity or insights into his use of imagination. 
                                                
7 This edition of “That in Aleppo Once…” come from The Best American Short Stories of 
the Century Collection, edited by John Updike and Katrina Kenison. It will be this 
version that I cite throughout. 
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This is an important device on the part of Nabokov that I believe crucial to the 
discussion, but due to the nature of its implications I find it more appropriate to return to 
the “existence” of the wife at the end of our discussion on “That in Aleppo Once….” I 
would rather like to start with the following statement of the narrator, one that I believe is 
a model example of memorial invocation.  
But I cannot discern her. She remains as nebulous as my best poem—the one you 
made such gruesome fun on in the Literaturnye Zapiski. When I want to imagine 
her I have to cling mentally to a tiny brown birthmark on her downy forearm, as 
one concentrates upon a punctuation mark in an illegible sentence. (“That in 
Aleppo Once…” 242) 
Our first question needs to be why the narrator seems to be forcing himself to remember 
or imagine his wife, despite the fact that it becomes incredibly apparent later on in the 
story that what he really wishes to do is forget she ever existed. We must also consider 
why it is that he claims he “cannot discern her,” and what it means that “she remains as 
nebulous” as his best poem. Before immediately addressing all of these questions, I take a 
moment to mediate on the narrator’s diction in this passage. He says, “When I want to 
imagine;” but why this word imagine rather than remember? Perhaps one could argue 
that the narrator here uses “imagine” as a word synonymous to remember and is simply 
musing over his desire to recollect an image of his wife; however, I would rather like to 
argue that Nabokov consciously and purposefully made this choice in diction.  
We find Nabokov to be a man who is very aware and knowledgeable of memorial 
nuances. Thus, simply assuming that he uses “image” and “remember” interchangeably is 
a shortcoming on the interpretation of his work. In Strong Opinions, we find an interview 
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conducted in September of 1966. As the introduction to this interview explains, Nabokov 
did not like to “talk off the cuff,” so he either wrote all of his answers down or dictated 
them to the interviewer (Strong Opinions 62). In this particular interview, Nabokov tells 
of his belief in imagination’s connection to memory, or he rather tells imagination to be a 
sort of memory where associative memory nourishes the imagination. We need to realize 
this passage to be looking introspectively into the mind of Nabokov, meaning that all the 
conclusions that Nabokov draws must come from self-analysis. He writes,  
I would say that imagination is a form of memory... An image depends on the 
power of association, and association is supplied and prompted by memory. When 
we speak of a vivid individual recollection we are paying a compliment not to our 
capacity of retention but to Mnemosyne’s mysterious foresight in having stored 
up this or that element which creative imagination may want to use when 
combining it with later recollections and inventions. In this sense, both memory 
and imagination are a negation of time. (Strong Opinions 78) 
From this statement we can see at the very least that Nabokov was very much cognizant 
of the distinctions to be made between memory and imagination. We, therefore, cannot 
simply assume that his narrator’s statement of “When I want to remember her” is a 
reference to mere recollection. For the moment, I simply wish this interview passage to 
stand as evidence of Nabokov’s awareness of the existing distinctions. 
 Establishing that this image of the narrator’s wife, which he desires to conjure, 
comes from the imagination forces us to question the origin of the nuances of the image. 
As we saw earlier in the interview from Strong Opinions, Nabokov insists that the 
imagined is dependent upon “the power of association,” which is clearly corroborated in 
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our passage from “That in Aleppo Once….” The narrator claims, “When I want to 
imagine her I have to cling mentally to a tiny brown birthmark on her downy forearm,” 
suggesting that not only is the imagination dependent upon association, but also there is 
an inherent practice of forcing particular associations when drawing upon the 
imagination. Nabokov’s narrator insists that the only way that he can imagine his wife is 
to call upon this very particular memory of her brown birthmark. Why this birthmark? At 
no other point in the story does he mention the brown birthmark, and so it seems in no 
way to be of any conscious importance to the narrator. It is also curious that the narrator 
seemingly attaches no actual memory to the birthmark. He generates an image of his wife 
based from the idea of the birthmark, yet he does not consider this image to be a direct 
memory.  
 The birthmark is certainly responsible for cuing the image of his wife as we saw 
the nail to act as a cue for Benjy’s mind to associate and remember back to the moment 
of getting stuck under the fence with Caddy. But this birthmark is not the same; we rather 
see its appearance in this story to be drastically foreign in comparison to those cues of 
association we saw in Chapter One. Unlike the nail or the smell of trees, the birthmark 
appears only once. It has no quality of repetition by which to nominate it a marker of 
associative memory, nor does it have temporal expansion—meaning, that we do not find 
the birthmark to reappear in various yet distinct moments. An absence of temporal 
expansion suggests that the birthmark was only once ever relevant to the mind of the 
narrator. Never did it act as a connector and foundation of memorial association and later 
learning. There was no compiling of information related to birthmarks. In fact this 
birthmark hold no plurality. It stands alone in one moment in time, and because of this, as 
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already hinted to, the mind of the narrator must force any recall of the birthmark and any 
related information. Forcing a mental image reveals two important things about the 
workings of the literary imagination: conjuring the imagination is seemingly unnatural 
and the imagination works with disregard to the temporal parameters needed by 
association. These two ideas are actually rather related. The unnatural disposition of the 
imagination is due to the fact that the mind must actively work to disregard its temporal 
present and return back to seemingly unrelated pasts. All of this implies that the image of 
the wife is fake or is not reproduced from an actual lived experience. In questioning the 
imagination, we do not look to question the validity of the image—validity determined by 
whether or not the mind ever actually perceived the image from its external environment. 
We question why we find the incitation of the imagined to be the remembered. Perhaps 
his wife did not have a brown birthmark on her arm, perhaps he never even had a wife, 
but the details do not matter as much as the reason why they are present in the story. 
 Understanding why the narrator imagines his wife through her birthmark is an 
understanding that we shall come to in time and further analysis, and so at this time I 
would like to take a moment to return to the very opening of “That in Aleppo Once….” 
The narrator opens his letter with a brief telling to his friend of how he had seen their 
friend, “good old Gleb Alexandrovich Gekko,” crossing the street some few days prior. 
Gleb Alexandrovich Gekko mentioned to the narrator that he seemed to think that the 
friend, the recipient of this letter, had been betraying “our national literature.” The 
narrator is clearly only writing to this friend because of the interaction with this Gleb 
Alexandrovich Gekko, who gave the narrator the recipient’s address. This then leads the 
narrator to continue on to his story, saying,  
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“I have a story for you. Which reminds me—I mean putting it like this reminds 
me—of the days when we wrote our first udder-warm bubbling verse, and all 
things, a rose, a puddle, a lighted window, cried out to us: ‘I’m a rhyme!’ Yes, 
this is a most useful universe. We play, we die: ig-rhyme, umi-rhyme. (“That in 
Aleppo Once…” 241) 
The story starts off with an association to a time when the narrator passed the days as a 
poet. This association is curious in the fact that it directs the mind to a time where art 
pervaded all mental faculties. At this time, his art, being literature, guided every 
perspective and interpretation. A time such as this allowed all to appear favorable and 
comprehensible, particularly when collected for the purpose of transforming into verse. 
Surely this time was preferable to the moment at which the narrator writes this letter 
since he comes to say at the end of this paragraph, “But just now I am not a poet” (“That 
in Aleppo Once… 241). This line informs us that something has happened to the mind, 
something that has dismissed the former mind of the artist.  
 The notion of the artistic mind thus becomes critical to the understanding of the 
imagination. Nabokov writes of his childhood and claims that all of the Russian children 
of his generation “passed through a period of genius” (Speak, Memory 14). What he then 
says I believe instigates a very provocative argument about human imagination: “Genius 
disappeared when everything had been stored, just as it does with those other, more 
specialized child prodigies—pretty, curly-headed youngsters waving batons or taming 
enormous pianos” (14). To Nabokov, the mind of the genius is clearly parallel to that of 
the Artist, yet it is simultaneously the undeveloped mind of the child. Be this the case, the 
mind will generally lose the ability to imagine well before it reaches physical maturity. 
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Now, this marking moment “when everything had been stored” is surely the moment 
when the genius dies in most. Arguably, this moment is synonymous with the infiltration 
of social construction, or the moment at which the mind is taught how to think. 
Seemingly, Nabokov is arguing that in most cases, artistic talent is lost when a foreign 
entity enters the mind. It may be difficult to recognize social influence as “foreign,” but 
we must remember the natural state of the mind—the period of time when the mind is 
innocent, before it has had any interaction with potential influencers. From this we find a 
supplement to the answer of why the imagination is unnatural: we are taught to 
remember, not to imagine. And so the imagination may be the natural disposition for the 
immature mind, but once memory infiltrates, and the mind develops, the “natural” state 
shifts. Nabokov writes the imagination to be the natural state of the infantile and 
adolescent mind, but he also writes this in most instances to be a terminal state. As we 
will discuss in the following chapter, this “natural” state really ends when memory 
formation begins. This suggests that the infantile mind, or the socially undeveloped mind, 
the imaginative mind, dies with the intrusion of social influence and construction. 
There is a clear connection to what Nabokov is calling “genius” and innocence. 
To push this a bit further, I question if this “genius” is not really synonymous with the 
ability to imagine. In a way, innocence allows for the virtuous mind to process and react 
on a level that is far beyond that of the “mature” mind. Social interaction ruins the unique 
qualities of the mind that revels in creativity. This mind of the child genius is 
simultaneously the mind of an Artist. This Artist is uninhibited by social pressures of 
how he should express himself—shortly, we shall come to discuss the failures of the 
teachings of conventional language on self-expression and thereby the imagination. By 
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being unrestricted, he can freely draw his reality without stipulation. Nabokov shows that 
some individuals clearly never lose this genius or they never lose the ability to imagine. 
Really in order to retain genius and maintain imagination, one must reject the limitations 
of expression imposed by social conditioning.  
However, Nabokov makes one other crucial point about the genius of the mind. 
Genius only disappears “when everything had been stored,” suggesting that genius, or 
imagination, disappears when the mind has become full of all its memories. In the 
previous chapter we found that Benjy developed a set of memories early on in his life. 
These memories, while changed through his life to varying degrees, remained the only 
memories that he ever possessed. At a point in development, one that occurs quite early 
on, the mind has captured all of the distinct memories that it will ever contain. After this 
point, the mind gains no more new memories. Certainly, the mind then participates in 
learning processes and at the end these memories are far grander and complex than their 
original form; but the quantity of the mind’s basic memory outlines will reach capacity. 
In part, the imagination must allow the mind to return back to its primal state where 
language was undefined and created entirely within the individual. This state ignores the 
taught conventional language but also ignores time in the sense that time requires the 
present to build upon the past. The imagination depends upon time in all the ways that 
association does not, by simply ignoring that there is cognitive and intellectual growth to 
be made. And so what we should recognize about the involvement of time in imagination 
is this need to return to a state that ignores social construction. 
Applying these notions to “That in Aleppo Once…” the narrator surely stands as a 
corrupted soul, a fact of which he is very much aware. He is rightly displeased that he can 
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no longer relate to his art. Whatever has torn him from this “genius” that Nabokov speaks 
of has damaged him just as much as the absence of art that the intrusion left behind. At 
the very end, the narrator writes to his friend,  
You, happy mortal, with your lovely family (how is Inès? how are the twins?) and 
your diversified work (how are the lichens?), can hardly be expected to puzzle out 
my misfortunes in terms of human communion, but you may clarify things for me 
through the prism of your art. (“That in Aleppo Once…” 249) 
Foremost, this image of the prism of art suggests the reflective nature that art provides for 
the mind of the beholder and the mind of the artist. A prism receives plain light and 
expels this light in a nuanced form of extraordinary color. Can we not say that the prism 
metaphorically takes in the mundane to release brilliant artistry? We shall consider the 
prism to be symbolic of the genius mind; thereby, suggesting that the mind of this 
“genius” is able to create sense of the world in ways that the mind of others cannot, 
principally due to its artistic capabilities. In this passage there stands a comparison 
between he who has lost his artistic genius and he who been able to maintain it.  He who 
has sustained his mind with “genius” cannot possibly understand the misfortune that 
causes one to force an image of the brown birthmark when he wishes to imagine because 
one with a genius mind is still innocent to the issues of any reality. However, this is an 
extreme case in that this individual would be one who avoided social influence and 
interaction. There is then the more likely occurrence of the individual who is able to 
return back to his imagination despite having a mind full of memory. This individual 
employs his imagination to make sense of all that he experiences in the esoteric world. 
One with a completely artistic and imaginative mind may be innocent, with an 
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implication of naïveté, however, is he the only one capable of fully comprehending all 
that the mind experiences? This narrator suggests so. He is the only one with a clear 
unimpeded view of his mind. Once the collective sphere is introduced to the individual 
mind, the genius is inundated with unnatural materials. The aspects that once defined the 
genius are muddled and eventually forgotten.  
 In Chapter One we talked a great deal of the relevance of time in memorial 
studies, and throughout this chapter we have as well hinted upon time’s importance to the 
creation of the imagination. As we have also alluded to, time and imagination have a very 
distinct relationship comparatively to time and memory. For this reason, I would like to 
spend some time focusing upon this relationship between time and the imagination, 
giving particular attention to the differences we find between the two relationships. Since 
in Chapter One, we put the discussion of time in the context of Faulkner and his writings, 
we shall now do the same with Nabokov. Like Faulkner, Nabokov also subscribes to 
Bergsonian theory (Mattison 36). To this note, Laci Mattison writes, “Not only does 
Nabokov demonstrate how the combination of memory and imagination is integral to 
understanding Bergsonian intuition, but through the performance of this insight we also 
discern the complex temporal layering of space in Nabokov’s writing” (Mattison 38). 
Nabokov writes to display the temporal matters of both memory and time, but these are 
of course separate concepts. While there are exchanges between both the imagination and 
memory, as we have seen, the specific identifying markers require different interactions 
with time, as Mattison alludes to.  
 In his novel, Ada, Nabokov wrote, “Physiologically the sense of Time is a sense 
of continuous becoming…Philosophically, on the other hand, Time is but memory in the 
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making. In every individual life there goes on, from cradle to deathbed, the gradual 
shaping and strengthening of that backbone of consciousness, which is the Time of the 
strong” (Ada 142-143). This notion of time speaks more to that which accompanies 
memory, however, I find it necessary to present it now as we begin a discussion of time 
in the context of the imagination with respect to the writings of Nabokov. These words 
expressing the gradual and dynamic nature of time in memory are to be our foundation 
for a comparison between time in the context of memory and time in the context of the 
imagination. In an interview, Nabokov stated there to be “all kinds of time” (Strong 
Opinions 185). There is the time that we apply to events measured by clocks and 
calendars, this being applied time. Nabokov claims that this applied time is “tainted by 
our notion of space, spatial succession, stretches and sections of space. When we speak of 
the ‘passage of time,’ we visualize an abstract river flowing through a generalized 
landscape. Applied time, measureable illusions of time, are useful for the purposes of 
historians and physicists” (Strong Opinions 185). This is our conventional time, the time 
of the clock. This is the time that exists in our minds as an artificial form. We know 
applied time because it is the time that we are taught to live by. However, this is not the 
form of time that is embedded in our minds.  
Applied time is of course not the only existing form of time, nor is it the only one 
that Nabokov names. Nabokov provides a beautiful definition of time that highlights the 
inherent need for artistic creation in an adequate construction of memories. He writes,  
Pure Time, Perceptual Time, Tangible Time, Time free of content and context, 
this, then, is the kind of Time described by my creature under my sympathetic 
direction. The past is also part of the tissue, part of the present, but it looks 
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somewhat out of focus. The past is a constant accumulation of images, but our 
brain is not an ideal organ to constant retrospection and the best we can do is to 
pick out and try to retain those patches of rainbow light flitting through memory. 
The act of retention is the act of art, artistic selection, artistic blending, artistic re-
combination of actual events. The bad memoirist re-touches his past, and the 
result is a blue-tinted or pink-shaded photograph taken by a stranger to console 
sentimental bereavement. The good memoirist, on the other hand, does his best to 
preserve the utmost truth of detail. One of the ways he achieves his intent is to 
find the right spot on his canvas for placing the right patch of remembered color. 
(Strong Opinion 186) 
We forget most of what we experience. As Nabokov writes, the “brain is not an ideal 
organ to constant retrospection;”  all that it can do is pick out little bits of time’s 
memories of the conscious mind. What we then do with these bits of time and how we 
appropriate them determines their value. From this passage, we find Nabokov to 
distinguish between the good and the bad memoirist. The bad memoirist retouches his 
past for the appeasement of his emotional mind; whereas, the good memoirist does all to 
preserve the past in every detail, even those saturated with trauma. These perhaps seem to 
be obvious definitions, but what comes out of them is Nabokov’s claim that “The act of 
retention is the act of art.” Art presents the truth of the past, even embracing all 
misfortunes. And so the good memoirist is the Artist, the individual who invokes his 
imagination but still sees that his imagination is dependent upon the past. We’ve already 
concluded that the imagination can stand alone in time, meaning that unlike memories 
that function by relating cues of the present to the same markers in the past, imagination 
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occurs in a present void of cues. Like we saw in “That in Aleppo Once…,” there was 
nothing in any present environment that brought him to an image of his wife. He had to 
force an image of her brown birthmark. The imagination recognizes time in the same 
manner as memory, in that it sees that which occurred in the past to be a memory; 
however, it does not regard the past as something to be altered.  
Apart from time’s responsibility to the imagination, I want to speak briefly about 
Nabokov’s claim that the “genius” or imagination is naturally occurring in the mind of 
the child. In the following chapter, we will come to speak about the infantile mind, 
memory formation, and society’s influence by means of social construction on the two. 
Here I address the mind of the child in the context of the imagination. According to 
Nabokov, the imagination leaves the child once the mind has retained all of its 
memories—we saw this earlier. To continue along this line of discussion for the purpose 
of further explicating nuances of the imagination, Nabokov’s own accounts of his 
childhood are inundated with imagined experiences. In Speak, Memory he writes,  
A dreamier and more delicate sensation was provided by another cave game, 
when upon awakening in the early morning I made a tent of my bedclothes and let 
my imagination play in a thousand dim ways with shadowy snowslides of linen 
and with the faint light that seemed to penetrate my penumbral covert from some 
immense distance, where I fancied that strange, pale animals roamed in a 
landscape of lakes. (Speak, Memory 13) 
Described in language that ultimately comes to fill the mind and kill the imagination, this 
passage is coated in words that bring a notion of a sublime memory, yet one that is also 
very nebulous in nature, making it very clearly “unreal.” We know this memory to have 
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come originally from the imagination even without Nabokov’s telling. It comes from a 
“dreamier and more delicate sensation,” a space in the mind that recognizes the memory 
as very separate from the external environment; it is, however, this external environment 
that makes memories such as this “unreal.” The first time that Nabokov’s mind lived this 
experience, we must assume that it seemed entirely real to him—it has only faltered from 
this individual sphere of reality due to arrival of memory. What then sets the imagined 
apart from the remembered is the intrusion of memories formed from a foundation of 
esoteric influence, and really, corruption that attempted to rewrite what was “real.”  
 The philosopher and phenomenologist, Edmund Husserl invokes the central 
philosophical premise of  “strong, unalloyed belief in the reality of experience” (Ender 
225). Husserl claims that our trust in memories derives from a belief in the existence of 
the world that we perceive. We sustain this belief by believing in the reality of our 
experience in the world (Ender 75). In speaking of Husserl’s theory, Jean Guillaumin 
writes, “[Memory] invokes a particular form of complex belief, which is founded on a 
more general characteristic of consciousness: ‘originary belief,’ ‘pure belief in the 
strongest sense’ in the reality of experience. In the experience of remembering, the 
assertion of reality is posited in the past” (Gullaumin 9). Thus, in order to remember the 
mind must believe in the reality in which it exists. From this we can also conclude that 
the mind must believe the reality of the spatial environment and the teachings of this 
reality. Furthermore, we must say that the reality must be well-defined in order for the 
individual mind to believe it, with a logical structure that the mind can perceive and make 
sense of. Arguably, to be “well-defined” the mind must be able to locate the reality 
within a spectrum of space and time. Evelyne Ender writes, “The representations that 
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Woolf has imagined for us, with their high degree of realism, feed this same desire for an 
unambiguous reality” (Ender 75). As we move now into a discussion of Virginia Woolf’s 
work, I would like to begin by questioning the charge of Ender’s statement. Foremost, the 
imagined stands apart from memory in its holding of an ambiguous reality. We can 
extrapolate from Ender, that the imagination is purposed to make sense of the reality. 
This does imply that the imagination can only exist when the mind starts to question the 
validity of the reality in which it remembers. The imagination must then work to 
understand the anomalies that first troubled the memory.  
 Ender writes, “Woolf richly illustrates the link between memory and the faculty 
of the imagination, by letting us see how images enable her to build memory scenes” 
(Ender 47). She is not necessarily incorrect in this assertion, however, I find her to be a 
bit too vague for us properly to make an argument in full agreement of her assertion. We 
can accept Ender’s argument if she is arguing that Woolf engages the imagination to 
clarify the realm from where the memory comes, although continuing on in her writing 
by no means corroborates Ender’s support of this point—“We have, of course, no other 
evidence for their existence than her words; for unlike neural patterns, which can be 
shown on a screen when a perception or a memory occurs, mental images escape our 
recording, measuring, or imaging devices” (Ender 47-48). Regardless, the questioning of 
Ender’s argument does lead us nicely into an analysis of Woolf’s work, particularly To 
the Lighthouse. This novel is considered to be not only one of Woolf’s best works, but 
also her novel that speaks best to the notions of memory and imagination (Nalbantian 
80). In looking at To the Lighthouse, we will further evaluate this relationship between 
memory, imagination, and reality.  
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 From now until the end of the chapter, we focus on Woolf. In regards to To the 
Lighthouse, we are to find the mind of Woolf, the creator of the novel, to be just as 
important as that of Lily Briscoe’s, Woolf’s creation and unmarried painter. The novel 
itself is divided into three sections, ending with the moment in which Lily finally 
completes her painting and Woolf her novel. For now, we turn our focus to the beginning 
of the third section8. This section takes place a decade or two after the first section, in a 
post-WWII world where most of the characters are absent or dead. Mrs. Ramsey, a 
protagonist of the first section has died, and is memorialized only by Lily’s memory. 
Within this section, there is one particular passage on which I wish to focus. The section 
begins with Lily wanting to ask, “D’ you remember, Mr. Carmichael?” (To the 
Lighthouse 96), which she repeats several times. This thought spawns a long moment of 
recollection, in which we almost seem to be located again in the first section of the novel. 
Lily’s memory completely envelops the narration, resulting in a form that once again 
questions the “present”—“’Is it a boat? Is it a cask?’ Mrs. Ramsey said. And she began 
hunting round for her spectacles. And she sat, having found them, silent, looking out to 
sea. And Lily painting, steadily, felt as if a door had opened….” (To the Lighthouse 96) It 
is really at this moment that Lily truly takes on her role as a painter. By this I mean to 
suggest, that as this artist, this possessor of “genius,” Lily is now charged with inciting 
her imagination to not only paint a picture in order to remember the past, but really to 
make sense of the past’s memories. To this point, Ender writes of “Time Passes,” the 
third section, to be the moment at which Mrs. Ramsey’s death becomes readily and 
mysteriously apparent. “Lily Briscoe, meanwhile, who is present throughout the 
                                                
8 The third section is entitled “Time Passes” 
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narrative, takes on the role of a witness, rememberer, and mourner…that [which] will 
commemorate the invisible presence is ultimately hers to take up” (Ender 213). 
 As Ender states, Lily’s role as an artist becomes synonymous with that of the 
“witness, rememberer, and mourner.” An idea which we see a strong presence of in the 
following passage: 
Lily stepped back to get her canvas—so—into perspective. It was an odd road to 
be walking, this further, until at last one seemed to be on a narrow plank, perfectly 
alone, over the sea. And she dipped into the blue paint, she dipped too into the 
past there. Now Mrs. Ramsey got up, she remembered. (To the Lighthouse 97) 
Lily here intentionally turns to her imagination by stepping back to retrieve the canvas. 
We find reason for this in all the turmoil passing around her. “D’ you remember?” 
marked the moment in which Lily’s past returned with issue. And so she turned to her 
canvas for catharsis. This catharsis comes in the form of the blue paint, a blue paint that 
reflects the past. Although, is reflects correct? Perhaps more appropriate would be to say 
that the blue paint instigates a rewriting of the past. Nalbantian writes, “Common to both 
the writer Woolf and her character the painter Briscoe, there is the retrieval of memory 
through the means of respective art” (Nalbantian 81). Art does not retrieve the memory, 
rather the memory retrieves the art and in doing so begs for reflexive clarification.  
In all the examples we have seen, memory precedes imagination—Nabokov’s 
narrator in “That in Aleppo Once…” needed to remember the problematic birthmark to 
form any image of his horrid wife and Lily Briscoe only turned to her canvas after 
experiencing emotional turmoil with her relationship to the past. Supporting this claim, 
the passage from To the Lighthouse, eventually comes to the following,  
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And this, Lily though, taking the green paint on her brush, this making up scenes 
about them, is what we call ‘knowing’ people, ‘thinking’ of them, ‘being fond’ of 
them! Not a word of it was true; she had made it up; but it was what she knew 
them by all the same. She went on tunneling her way into her picture, into her 
past. (To the Lighthouse 97) 
She paints because she knows her memories to be untrue. Seemingly, it was only the 
canvas that revealed the true nuances behind the problematic nature of these memories, 
for it was only after her turning to the canvas that she was able to see reason. By turning 
to the canvas Lily is able to make changes to the falseness of “’knowing’ people, 
‘thinking’ of them, ‘being found of them,” and we will see this truly illuminated in the 
closing scene of the novel. 
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Conventional Language and Reality 
 
I wish to shift now from talking directly about the purpose of the imagination to 
why it is that the imagination is necessary and what the exact problems are that lead to 
any disbelief of a reality. We have already briefly touched upon the fact that social 
conditioning teaches the mind a structured language that limits self-expression. 
Particularly, in the context of imagination, I consider this to be an idea that we need to 
explore in some depth. We begin with Virginia Woolf in what follows as the fallibility of 
society’s language. On April 29th, 1937, Virginia Woolf recorded a program with the 
BBC entitled “Craftsmanship.” In it, she spoke of the fallacies of the English language, or 
rather the inability of such to accurately articulate the mind’s word. The entire piece is 
arguably fascinating, but I find there to be a notion of particular delight, one that Woolf 
employs multiple times throughout her talk, that “words do not live in dictionaries; they 
live in the mind” (“Craftsmanship” 2). In the most basic of senses we can say that Woolf 
is here arguing for the fallibility of conventional language in the translation of mental 
processes. The issue of language is paramount in the consideration of most any literary 
topic, but given the speaker of these above words, I find it most appropriate to examine 
the issue of language in the context of the writer and her mind. In order to do so, we will 
first create a theoretical framework from which to consider the nuances of language in its 
workings with communications and mental translations (again, how is this related to 
imagination?). When building this framework, we engage the words of the writer so to 
best capture the experiences that language can languish upon her mind. From here we 
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consider the theoretical conclusions that we come upon through the practices of Virginia 
Woolf, Meena Alexander, and Lily Briscoe (as a creation of Virginia Woolf, but still 
brilliant example of the woman Artist); all of this hopefully to come to answer how 
language treats the mind and the mind’s imagination.  
It is important to qualify that we are talking about a strict adherence to language, a 
language that is taught as the proper means of expression. We will come to talk in more 
detail about the social construction of memory and reality, but we need to here realize 
language to follow a similar birth. We are taught our language, how to write, speak, and 
think—in fact, it is believed that memory formation cannot begin until the mind learns 
language—but because language too falls victim to the powers of social construction, 
language limits our abilities of expression based on what the respective society has 
deemed appropriate in its collective memory. We label this means of collective 
expression “conventional language.” To assume that all forms of expression fail to 
actually present what the speaker desires to convey would ignore art. However, it is 
important to question what it is that we are even taught to think through this conventional 
language. Kandel explains that certain studies of individuals with developmental 
disorders such as dyslexia and autism have shown that individuals with language 
disabilities may still have the ability of artistic expression. This then suggests that despite 
both being methods of “symbolic communication,” visual art and language may not be 
intrinsically linked in the brain; Kandel then postulates that the human ability of artistic 
expression predates that of spoken language (The Art of Insight 485).  
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 For the sake of determining the exact fault of language, which I believe it 
necessary to first do in this analysis, I offer Woolf’s quotation on the residency of words 
a bit of context. She says: 
It is words that are to blame. They are the wildest, freest, more irresponsible, most 
unteachable of all things. Of course, you can catch them and sort them and place 
them in alphabetical order in dictionaries. But words do not live in dictionaries; 
they live in the mind. If you want proof of this, consider how often in moments of 
emotion when you most need words we find none. (“Craftsmanship” 2) 
We here find two principal ideas: the culpability of words and the absence of words in 
moments of intense emotion. Foremost, we must grapple with why we are to blame 
words. The suggestion of the immense power that belongs to words, yet the 
condemnation of its misplacement, yields the view that words cannot make sense of the 
mind’s intricacies. Arguably, we try but fail to put the neurological firings that comprise 
a thought into understandable form. Language, words, are our understandable form, or so 
we are taught. This notion is important when considering that no thought originates in 
this design. Social teachings instruct us to translate every conscious thought into an 
intelligible object that we can communicate to the self and then the external world. This 
object, as Woolf alludes to earlier in her talk, is the sentence, the novel, the written page, 
anything set in linguistic structure that expresses thought. 
 When we attempt to objectify the intangible, we end with a product that is lacking 
meaning. It is most interesting that Woolf exemplifies the failing of words through the 
expression of emotion. Out of all the mind’s faculties, why does she call upon emotion? 
In doing so she is arguably invoking a great sensitivity in the matter of emotional 
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expression. It is emotional expression that is evidently far more potent to the being than 
all other of the mind’s nuances. But now why is it that words fail us so harshly? For 
Woolf, the conventional language has become stale. We, as speakers and communicators, 
are essentially desensitized to the individual word. There is the potential of accurate 
linguistic expression, for “[i]t is only a question of finding the right words and putting 
them in the right order. But we cannot do it because they do not live in dictionaries; they 
live in the mind” (“Craftsmanship” 6). 
 Perhaps it would now be best to question what words have really become. We 
have noted the human mind now to be desensitized to the word; meaning, that as 
communicators we are immune to the power of the tools that we are taught to use for 
expressing. I would like to call to the ideas of Viktor Shklovsky whose theory on 
language, art, and defamiliarization is highly relevant to this part of the discussion. 
Shklovsky wrote, “If we start to examine the general laws of perception, we see that as 
perception becomes habitual, it becomes automatic” (Shklovksy 17). He speaks to the 
universal issue of stale perception. As humans, we train our minds to function in 
patterns—as we shall come to discuss in the conclusion. In doing so, the once fantastic 
becomes the now mundane. We choose to complicate, thereby forgetting the nuances that 
articulate our appreciable lives. Our language is principally culpable. Shklovsky explains 
how desensitized perception is directly related to meaningless linguistic expression. 
Thus, for example, all of our habits retreat into the area of the unconsciously 
automatic; if one remembers the sensations of holding a pen or of speaking in a 
foreign language for the first time and compares that with his feeling at 
performing the action for the ten thousandth time, he will agree with us. Such 
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habituation explains the principles by which, in ordinary speech, we leave phrases 
unfinished and words half expressed. (Shklovsky 17) 
In language, we accept normalcy and convention. We do not attempt to stretch the word 
to our idea; we rather fit the idea to the word. As we shall come to discuss, this is not a 
phenomenon foreign to the memorial realm.  This is what we are taught to do. This is 
how we are taught to think, and so our thoughts have not only been burdened with the 
quality of innate incompleteness, but also stand to repeat this damnation. Woolf alludes 
to the fact that in part, our words are meaningless because collective memory has 
saturated them to a complete aridity.  
 We have overused them, words that is. Although perhaps better said, we rely too 
heavily on memory for the word’s definition. As Woolf says in the opening of 
“Craftsmanship”: 
Words, English words, are full of echoes, of memories, of associations. They have 
been out and about, on people’s lips, in their houses, in the streets, in the fields, 
for so many centuries. And that is one of the chief difficulties of writing them 
today—that they are stored with other meanings, with other memories, and they 
have contracted so many famous marriages in the past. (“Craftsmanship” 4) 
Your word relies upon what he already said, and in saying it, he decided what it was to 
mean. One has the ability to repeat the word, but it will do no justice to the thoughts, for 
it’s been used once already. It’s done and has gone stale. The process proceeds very 
basically as follows: an individual perceived an unnamed object centuries ago and labeled 
and defined this object based on his interpretation of his perception. Society then 
ingrained this definition in its “dictionary,” so that today when we speak the same word, 
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we contend that we call upon the very same definition, or rather interpretation. What is a 
word’s meaning if not an interpretation? The problem holds that the individual mind is 
unique—no two will ever rest upon that very same interpretation. Hence, we develop this 
social “dictionary,” but what we can really refer to as linguistic collective memory, does 
not suit the unique quality of human thought.  
Language holds obvious social purposes. Kandel writes, “the capability of the 
human brain for language and storytelling enables us to model our world and to 
communicate those models to others” (The Art of Insight 443). Simply stated, we 
empower language as our means of communication. That is not to say that this language 
is fully apt to its job, but simply that it is the way we engage in social construction. 
Nancy Gray writes that “[a] language of one’s own that is also language itself is not 
invented or so esoteric as to be inaccessible but a process of contextual experience, like 
subjectivity…[l]anguage and experience become interactive, so that words are not merely 
symbolic but also experiential” (Gray 5). Gray here posits two points: language, even that 
which may appear to be adverse, is in fact accessible due to the simple fact that it is 
language, and language is the means by which we convey experience. Gray’s second 
point is somewhat ambiguous, but her argument seems to be that language is the means 
by which to convey experience from the individual to the external world as well as from 
the individual to the internal self of that very individual. Gray, it seems to me, simplifies 
both issues far too greatly. She assumes that the individual has control of the language 
that they speak; that is to say that the individual holds every word to be the true and 
appropriate to articulate one specific sentiment. Now, we know this to be an impossible 
phenomenon, especially when the judge of accuracy is a society that is made up of such 
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persons with every such mental composure. In order for language to be  “one’s own,” that 
one person must have agency and understanding over his language, an impossible 
metaposition to achieve.  
The second scenario really speaks to the fact that the brain stores and recalls 
memorial nuances in a way that is palpable to the mind. That is to say, that the brain 
translates the biophysical and biochemical markers of a memory into a language that the 
mind consciously speaks. Surely this translation foregoes some amount of meaning in its 
process, however, we have been conditioned to remember in no other way. We come to 
remember in words. Perhaps remembering in words holds some amount of sense since 
one first consciously perceives the memory’s experience in the same manner. All 
conscious thought occurs in the language that the respective environment first teaches the 
mind.  
As Woolf says in “A Letter to a Young Poet,” “The poet is trying honestly and 
exactly to describe a world that has perhaps no existence except for one particular person 
at one particular moment” (Woolf 218). The notion behind this quotation is critical to the  
understanding of this current discussion. Woolf here names and recognizes the 
uniqueness of perception; however, and more importantly, she projects an awareness of 
the inherent agency found in language. She describes her own process, and on that very 
basic level, a process that all writers experience—the ability to manipulate language to an 
idea, be that a theory, an image, or a lyric. One purpose of art, then, is to capture a 
moment, an experience that belongs to the Artist. We will return to this question of what 
art is and how it is related to language, but first I think it necessary to continue 
questioning why we structure our language upon such a fundamentally faulty system of 
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definition. Perhaps the issue at hand is not so much the search for an answer as to why we 
rely so heavily on language for expression, but rather the need for an acceptance of the 
fact that the language we have entrusted to translate and communicate our thoughts will 
never be able to do so completely. As Woolf cited, many times at moments of utmost 
emotional desperation, words are absent.  But can we rather say, nonexistent?  
Meena Alexander, an author, poet, and professor who was raised in India and 
Sudan, went to England for her graduate studies and afterwards moved to New York 
where she got a job at a university, married, and started a family. A great deal of her 
work focuses upon issues of immigration and identity and the impacts of those two issues 
on the writer’s subjectivity (Maxey 1). Additionally, she also writes much about her 
struggles with language, that is, issues concerning translation from one language to 
another (be it English to French or Malayalam to English), and she also tells of her pains 
simply to capture words.  
Sometimes words flee from me. And I fall through a dark door, into a zone where 
consonants and vowels vanish, when syntax bends into broken hooks, like so 
many pieces of jagged metal. I feel at such times as if I were walking in between 
the tracks of languages, much as one might walk between the rails of a train line 
and touch the stone beneath, bloody dirt over which the lines of transport are laid. 
(Alexander 259) 
Let us look upon these words such as “dark,” “vanish,” “jagged,” “bloody,” and 
“broken.” They mark a level of obvious pain. This level functions to present Alexander’s 
realization of her inability to communicate with language. What is interesting here is her 
assertion that she is the victim when words leave her, not anyone else. She suffers, not 
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those who stand outside of her mind waiting to hear her voice. Alexander’s description is 
unbelievably provocative; her words in their absence have abandoned her in a state of 
utter despair. 
This image of the trapped, and really tortured, author invokes nothing more than 
the confirmation of language’s inadequacies, inadequacies that create a duality in this 
idea of being lost—one side being the failure to communicate with the external world and 
the other being the failure to communicate with the self. Alexander explains that 
“sometimes I have felt that I was translating from a place of no words—translate in the 
early sense, of transporting across a border” (Alexander 259). Well, then, what is there? 
If there exists a place with no words, what is there in instead? For surely we need words 
because we have trained ourselves to be within words. As I have already articulated, we 
train our minds to think in words. Despite the mind’s capabilities of performing far 
beyond the limitations of words, we have restricted our conscious thoughts to these 
words. And so what does happen when there are no words? I arrive at one more question 
that I think may lead the rest of this discussion—when words cannot appropriately 
express an emotion or thought, do they really exist at all? Or rather, should we assume 
that they do not exist so that we do not attempt dishonorably to articulate that which we 
desire to communicate? 
As I made the distinction earlier, we have been talking about conventional 
language—words, sentences, letters—all of which are surely fine to communicate ideas 
in some situations. This is again just the form of language that conditions our mind to 
consider itself as the socially proper means of conversation. Language, at least 
conceptually, is not limited to this sort of formal structuring of words. The purpose of 
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language is to communicate, again with the world and with the self. We should for no 
reason assume that communication must occur through only one medium, especially one 
that is often inadequate. What about a painting, or poem, a dance or song? What about 
art? Why do we seem to assume that art is not often a more appropriate alternative to 
conventional language?  
Woolf and Alexander speak a great deal about the troubles that language brings 
them, but we do find them both offering an alternative, a remedy. Alexander turns to 
poetry— 
It seems to me that the lyric poem is a form of extreme silence, which is protected 
from the world. To make a lyric poem I have to enter into a dream state. But at the 
same time, almost by virtue of that disconnect, it becomes a very intense location 
to reflect on the world. (Alexander 284)  
Woolf furnishes a very similar statement in “A Sketch of the Past,” focusing upon an 
artistic form of language to free herself from the binds and pain in which conventional 
words have often left her.  
…it is a token of some real thing behind appearances; and I make it real but 
putting it into words. It is only by putting it into words that I make it whole; this 
wholeness means that it has lost its power to hurt me; it gives me, perhaps 
because by doing so I take away the pain, a great delight to put the severed parts 
together. (“Sketch of the Past” 72) 
By taking control of the words that have otherwise plagued her, Woolf turns the charge of 
the words into her catharsis; in fact, both women do. They turn to the very words that 
drove them to the depths of pain into art.  
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Here I think it important to now ruminate on what art really is and the purpose 
that art has for the human mind, and a good starting place is with the psychologist, 
Rudolf Arnheim, who writes of the presence of society in the viewing of art.  
With the turn towards psychology, the theory of art began to take cognizance of 
the difference between the physical world and its appearance, and subsequently, 
of the further difference between what is seen in nature and what is recorded in an 
artistic medium…What is seen depends on who is looking and who taught him to 
look. (Arnheim 75)  
I think it also important to note that Alexander writes in her memoir, Fault Lines, that she 
found it nearly impossible to write about certain moments such as her father’s death. She 
instead created poems to liberate these moments, writing, “Bit by bit I realized that the 
form of the poem offered something I needed, a translation out of the boundaries of the 
actual, a dance of words that might free me from my own body” (Alexander 121). She 
does attempt to write about some of these particular moments in Fault Lines, the 
moments she claims are easier to put into verse, but she does so with very obvious 
difficulty.  
For example, the remembrance of her grandfather’s sexual abuse marks an intense 
emotional response by Alexander. She extracts a bit of the memory in her memoir, but 
the result is highly broken, disorganized, and really ineffective when juxtaposed to the 
same moment in her poem, “Black River, Walled Garden.” In the poem she writes, “Who 
could I tell about the library?/ What grandfather did with fingers, lips, and thighs,/ within 
the sight of Bibles, encyclopedias, dictionaries” (Alexander). This account is far more 
intimate, descriptive, and telling than the broken version from her memoir—“His library 
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with the theology books and books of Gandhi and Marx and Lenin. The tea desk where I 
had to lie down as he touched my body” (Alexander 240). In Fault Lines, Alexander 
attempted to focus upon everything but the actual focal point, that being, the sexual abuse 
by her grandfather.  
Art, for Alexander, thus becomes her catharsis from conventional language and 
the traumas of her reality. Still holding the same purpose of communication, her art, in 
the form of poetry, allows her to not only accurately express that which needs to be 
expressed but also provide a therapeutic release that her other structured words cannot 
possess. Likewise, in writing about To the Lighthouse, Ellen Tremper remarks about 
Woolf  “…and thus enable her to make art in a different way, for language has a reflexive 
effect on its maker” (Tremper 5). Turning words into art creates understanding of the 
most intimate self. What we then find is the ability to reflect upon the self and the reality 
of this self. When restriction of expression is muted, we may arguably ruminate upon the 
memory’s image rather than focusing upon articulating the details of the memory for the 
purpose of comprehension. Art, without the rules and structure of conventional language, 
permits the mind to release without obligation. This is a complicated phenomenon that 
we have really yet fully to understand, but if not from personal experience, we can see 
from artists such as Woolf and Alexander that art and the imagination can succeed where 
simple words cannot.  Thoughts are not restricted to an agreed upon form that all are 
taught to understand; rather, art’s words, the imagination, are concerned foremost with 
making sense of the world.  
What then is this art? It is very much a sort of language, though nothing similar to 
this conventional language, which we have been examining in the previous pages of this 
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chapter. I wrote previously that art might have the power to substitute when conventional 
language is insufficient. Here I wish to address this possibility. Shklovksy wrote that art 
fights against defamiliarzation. Art allows the mind to portray what it sees instead of 
what it has been taught to see.  
And art exists that one may recover the sensation of life; it exists to make one feel 
things, to make the stone stony. The purpose of art is to impart the sensation of 
things as they are perceived and not as they are known. The technique of art is to 
make objects ‘unfamiliar,’ to make forms difficult, to increase the difficult and 
length of perception because the process of perception is an aesthetic end in itself 
and must be prolonged. (Shklovsky 21) 
This idea of art making the “unfamiliar” is paramount. By this idea, art is a teacher but a 
teacher who teaches all that the lessons of society’s social conditioning classes left out. It 
shows us something new and tells us why this something is. Art transforms convention 
for the sake of the individual, the soul of the individual. Art invokes well-being amidst a 
stifling world. 
 Woolf and Alexander both show us that they have decided to manipulate their 
conventional language into an imagined language. Of course, this cannot be said to be the 
case simply because the women are writers. Surely many writers do no use their words as 
art, nor do they consider them to be so. Their status as artists comes from the active 
desire to write their words into a cathartic medium.  Woolf develops a beautiful statement 
about her relationship with her art, one I believe to greatly corroborate this current 
argument, and also one that renders sense to her creation of Lily Briscoe. In regards to 
writing, she states: 
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Perhaps this is the strongest pleasure known to me. It is the rapture I get when in 
writing I seem to be discovering what belongs to what; making a scene come 
right; making a character come together. From this I reach what I might call a 
philosophy; at any rate it is a constant idea of mine; that behind the cotton wool is 
hidden a pattern that we—I mean all human beings—are connected with this; that 
the whole world is a work of art; that we are parts of the work of art. (“A Sketch 
of the Past” 72) 
Art for Woolf clarifies two concern, one’s world and one’s self. Woolf’s nonfiction 
writings certainly speak to this notion, as we have seen, but her fiction is perhaps an even 
more powerful example of art’s triumph over conventional language.  
As a source of Woolf’s fiction, I turn to To the Lighthouse and Woolf’s Lily 
Briscoe as dual complement to Meena Alexander the poet and Virginia Woolf the 
writer—all in regards to the notion of art as a more appropriate means of communication 
when simple words fail. Tremper argues that Woolf wrote To the Lighthouse from a base 
of personal experience. In reference to the elaboration of “ordinary experience,” Tremper 
posits that “[t]his elaboration represents her conscious reworking and rewording of those 
fleeting impressions in the Golders Green. It becomes the medium through which she 
expresses her profoundest idea” (Tremper 5). On June 23, 1923 Woolf wrote in her diary 
of a moment spent with Mary Sheepshank in Golders Green. 
The fresh breeze went brushing all the thick hedges which divide the gardens. 
Somehow, extraordinary emotions possessed me. I forget now what. Often now I 
have to control my excitement- as if I were pushing through a screen; or as if 
something beat fiercely close to me. What this portends I don't know. It is a 
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general sense of the poetry of existence that overcomes me. Often it is connected 
with the sea & St Ives. Going to 46 continues to excite. . . . The sight of 2 coffins 
in the Underground luggage office I daresay constricts [?] all my feelings. I have 
the sense of the flight of time; & this shores up my emotions. (Woolf Diary 
11:246) 
This moment shows itself to be remarkably influential to Woolf’s emotions. A multitude 
of the details from this entry find their way into To the Lighthouse, arguably on both a 
conscious and unconscious part of Woolf to bring new sensation to her experience. The 
presence of details found in the mind’s emotional cellars in work that we consider fiction 
speaks greatly to the artist’s participation in her own imagination and the necessity of her 
imagination to understand her world. All these details of Woolf’s experience, the 
inspirations for her creation “shore[s] up my emotions.” The very source for her art is 
stored within the walls of her mind’s emotion-controlling amygdala.  As we have already 
seen through the example of Alexander, words find it most difficult to express moments 
of intense emotion. Arguably, any language other than her artistic form would have left 
Woolf with a lacking portrayal of this experience in Golders Green.  
 To the Lighthouse ends with Lily’s completion of her painting that was a work-in-
progress for decades. There was a great deal that had to happen to Lily’s consciousness 
before it was able appropriately to coalesce the actual experience and the blank canvas. 
“Questions about the nature of life, the importance of relationships and choices, must be 
posed and answered before one can ‘see’ as an artist and interpret the world for others” 
(Tremper 14). I take issue with Tremper’s argument that questions must be answered 
before one can be an artist. Looking at the artistic examples of Woolf and Alexander in 
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addition to their firsthand accounts of dealing with art, it is, I believe, the unanswered 
questions that generate the art. Surely, a wonder is not art’s only inspiration; however, it 
does not make sense to assume that every artist is all knowing. Factually, the artist or the 
genius knows no more than her audience. She is simply more aware of the questions that 
need to be posed. And more importantly, I find that Woolf and Alexander teach us that 
the purpose of art is not actually to come upon answers, but rather to relish comfortably 
enough in oneself to be able to see what it is that needs answering. The artist is aware that 
conventional language cannot convey or make sense of the workings of her mind. In 
Mikko Makela’s opinion, “It becomes clear from Lily’s tiring battle to signify on canvas 
that at the heart of the novel lies the uneasy question of whether the signifier can ever 
satisfyingly express the signified” (Makela 236). I am not sure that any works of Woolf 
or Alexander ever speak to this concern. It will surely always be the artist’s struggle to 
“satisfyingly express the signified.” What Woolf and Alexander do suggest is that the 
simple fact that the artist has moved beyond accepting the failure of conventional 
language proves, at least partially, her triumph over words.   
 The concluding passage of To the Lighthouse speaks strikingly to many of the 
ideas that we have discussed up until this point, thus, I think it appropriate to share the 
passage in its entirety. 
Quickly, as if she were recalled by something over there, she turned to her canvas. 
There is was—her picture. Yes, with all its greens and blues, its lines running up 
and across, its attempt at something. It would be hung in attics, she thought; it 
would be destroyed. But what did that matter? she asked herself, taking up her 
brush again. She looked at the steps; they were empty; she looked at her canvas; it 
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was blurred. With a sudden intensity, as if she saw it clear for a second, she drew 
a line there, in the centre. It was done; it was finished. Yes, she thought, laying 
down her brush in extreme fatigue, I have had my vision. (To the Lighthouse 117) 
We must principally see Woolf in this passage rather than Lily Briscoe. Until the last line 
Woolf continues to write in the third person, and then ends with herself in the first. And 
so the line “I have had my vision” has a dual speaker—the obvious Lily Briscoe, and 
Woolf who came to artistic completion through the writing and creation of this character. 
The moment is intimate. Lily has completed “her picture” and Woolf her character. 
Woolf concluded her piece with the simultaneous completion of a literal work of art. This 
passage contains a clear indication that this painting was the only possible form by which 
to express the vision at hand, the purpose of which was to generate sense for the self. Lily 
struggled for years and only reached her final brushstroke when she realized that she was 
satisfied, that she had found the answer in her art. This moment has a dual significance. 
The painting signifies successful artistic expression by Lily, whereas, Lily signifies 
successful artistic expression by Woolf and relief from collective reality.  
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Chapter Three 
 
 
Infantile Memory, Collective Memory, and Confabulation: Rethinking The Sound 
and the Fury, To the Lighthouse, Speak Memory 
 
“Except I can’t remember anything before I was about 4 because I wasn’t looking at 
things in the right way before then, so they didn’t get recorded properly.” 
-Christopher, The Curious Incident of the Dog in the Night-time  
 
 
Chapter One examined explicit memory, being that form of memory that  
consciously recalls people, objects, and places of experience. We now return to explicit 
memory, if only briefly to reevaluate these memories in the context of what they mean in 
the recalling process. To summarize from Chapter One, explicit memories allow the mind 
to travel spatially and temporally, and conjure up events and emotional states that “have 
vanished into the past yet somehow continue to live on in our minds” (In Search of 
Memory 57). Recall of explicit memory is very much distinct from that of implicit 
memory in that because explicit memory is episodic in nature, it is easier for the mind to 
“falsely” conjure details. Kandel explains: 
But recalling a memory episodically—no matter how important the memory—is 
not like simply turning to a photograph in an album. Recall of memory is a 
creative process. What the brain stores is thought to be only a core memory. Upon 
recall, this core memory is then elaborated upon and reconstructed, with 
subtractions, additions, elaborations, and distortions. (In Search of Memory 84) 
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Kandel concludes this passage by posing the rhetorical question, “What biological 
processes enable me to review my own history with such emotional vividness?” (In 
Search of Memory 84). That the nature of the mind rewrites the presentation of the 
explicit memory each time it remembers, or so Kandel urges us to accept. This chapter, 
then, discusses why and how it is that the mind transforms its memories in such a way. 
Such transformations of memory lead to a great many outcomes, all of which impact our 
analysis of literary texts. Why such memories are feigned during recall becomes our first 
point of discussion. To answer this question, we consider the beginning of memory in the 
human mind: infantile memory. From here, we will discuss social conditioning and 
construction, and conclude by asking what both these processes impart on the mind and 
in what ways they shape it. We lastly turn to the topic of memory transformation and 
confabulation and examine how and why forgetting is not only a part of memory but also 
why the socially conditioned mind is sometimes forced to forget.   
 In the previous chapter, we spoke briefly about imagination in the mind of the 
child, paying particular attention to citations from Nabokov and Woolf.  We return to 
these two literary figures, but this time, inquiring more on the nature of infantile memory. 
Previously, a passage from Nabokov’s Speak, Memory told of remembering from 
imagination, a “cave game” where the building was done with bedclothes. We return to 
this passage to find Nabokov declare the paramount importance of childhood memories 
such as these.  
How small the cosmos (a kangaroo’s pouch would hold it), how paltry and puny 
in comparison to human consciousness, to a single individual recollection, and its 
expression in words! I may be inordinately fond of my earliest impressions, but 
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then I have reason to be grateful to them. They led the way to a veritable Eden of 
visual and tactical sensations. (Speak, Memory 13) 
 
In claiming that his earliest impressions bring about this “veritable Eden of visual and 
tactical sensations,” Nabokov is citing these adolescent memories as the foundation of his 
memory system. Eden is suggestive of a locale of origin, a beautiful origin where the 
mind and its memories have yet to become clouded with hideous experience. Thus, it also 
suggests a sentiment of innocence attached to these earliest impressions, an innocence 
marked by the absence of any infiltration to validate the memory as a place in an esoteric 
realm.  
 But what becomes of these memories? Nabokov tells us that certain adolescent 
memories act as a sort of infrastructure in his individual memory framework but surely 
something must happen to these memories, for we cannot rightly assume that the mind 
preserves them in their original state. The mind created these memories by the individual 
memory framework. However, at this point in the development, the mind had really not 
experienced the collective memory framework. After the point of formation of these 
individual adolescent memories, the collective memory framework intrudes. Once this 
occurs, the mind creates its memories from neither the individual memory framework nor 
the collective memory framework; it is rather forced to find a point of coexistence for the 
two. Although, before delving into a discussion of the exact implications of this 
phenomenon, I continue with Nabokov’s examples and his earliest impressions. In 
regards to these “earliest impressions,” Nabokov writes the following, 
Nothing is sweeter or stranger than to ponder those first thrills. They belong to the 
harmonious world of a perfect childhood and, as such, possess a naturally plastic 
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form in one’s memory, which can be set down with hardly any effort; it is only 
starting with the recollections of one’s adolescence that Mnemosyne begins to get 
choosy and crabbed. (Speak, Memory 13) 
If adolescent memories are “naturally plastic,” as Nabokov insists, they are then 
malleable in response to future experiences. Given that these adolescent memories are 
representative of a perfect world, they provide a certain sense of catharsis for the mature 
mind, one that is perforated with social obligation. As means of relief for the mind, these 
childhood memories are not far removed from the effects of the imagination.  
 Like the imagination adolescent memories are charged with placing the mind in a 
state removed from the confusion and constraint of the esoteric invasion of the collective 
memory framework. The individual memory sphere is thus defined as those memories 
that were created at the point of mental development that predated social incursion. These 
memories, partially because we find them to be so vastly different than those formed later 
on in life, are memories that form their own particular reality. In considering how 
memories affect the mind, we must consider what the mind believes to be “real” or “true” 
and thus, what the mind considers to be “reality.”  Consider that we have two different 
spheres of memories, those constructed by a society and those that are essentially organic 
and innocent, making two different spheres of reality. I nominate these the sphere of 
collective reality and the sphere of individual reality. To speak of these two spheres, I 
imply that by definition they are entirely separate, particularly in reference to the 
individual sphere of reality. That is to say, that though individual memories coalesce to 
form the collective memory, or the collective sphere of reality, we realize that their 
intermingling extends no further. But, as highlighted in the previous paragraph, these 
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adolescent memories are supposedly plastic, indicating that they struggle to keep their 
integrity.  In struggling to keep their own integrity, they simultaneously struggle to 
maintain the reliability of the individual sphere of reality. Because of this, the individual 
sphere of reality is presumably depleted as the mind moves farther and farther away from 
its point of adolescent experiences. It is depleted in the quantity of memories that 
structure the reality and as well as the strength, and therefore, the believability of the 
memories.  
 Let us look to the concluding line in the Nabokov passage cited above—“it is only 
starting with the recollections of one’s adolescence that Mnemosyne begins to get choosy 
and crabbed” (Speak, Memory 13). In many ways, this line reiterates what we established 
in the previous paragraph, but we can interpret the line a step further and complicate the 
issue. To claim that the recollection of childhood memories brings Mnemosyne to the 
point of being “choosy and crabbed,” Nabokov suggests that it is not the adolescent 
memories themselves that cause the disjointed nature of the individual reality sphere, as 
compared to that of the collective reality sphere, but rather the process of remembering 
these experiences and bringing them back to the forefront of the mind. In every process 
of recollection, the mind is reevaluating the experience in memory through a different 
perspective than it held at the time when it turned the experience into memory. Once the 
mind has reached maturity, these differences in perspective vary relatively little to those 
between the mind pre-maturation and post-maturation. Therefore, recollection of the 
earliest impressions is really the mind examining the original experience through a 
perspective that was entirely foreign to the mind at the point of memorial inception. 
Surely, the mind then struggles to understand and contextualize its earliest impressions 
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because the realities in which the memory was first formed and the reality in which the 
mind now lives are estranged.  
 In To the Lighthouse, we find Woolf presenting a very fascinating argument in 
regards to adolescent memory. As already mentioned, To the Lighthouse is divided 
amongst three sections. The very first section begins with Mrs. Ramsey promising her 
six-year-old son that tomorrow they will visit the lighthouse. Some pages and argument 
later, Mr. Ramsey declares that in fact, “There’ll be no landing at the lighthouse 
tomorrow” (To the Lighthouse 6). His son is disappointed, but we move on in the story. 
Some subdivisions later, Mrs. Ramsey thinks again of the possibility of bringing her 
youngest son to visit the lighthouse the following day—“In a moment he would ask her, 
‘Are we going to the Lighthouse?’ And she would have to say, ‘No: not tomorrow; your 
father says not’” (To the Lighthouse 36). Mrs. Ramsey then worries that her son will 
continue to think that they “are not going to the Lighthouse tomorrow,” but more so than 
worry, she thinks that “he will remember that all his life” (To the Lighthouse 36). This 
thought apparently plagues Mrs. Ramsey for some time because Woolf writes a few lines 
after this initial mention, “No, she thought, putting together some of the pictures he had 
cut out—a refrigerator, a mowing machine, a gentleman in evening dress—children never 
forget” (To the Lighthouse 36). The idea of the child never forgetting becomes an 
obsession of Mrs. Ramsey, as proof in the following passage: 
Often she found herself sitting and looking, sitting and looking, with her work in 
her hands until she became the thing she looked at—that light, for example. And 
it would lift up on it some little phrase or other which had been lying in her mind 
like that—‘Children don’t forget, children don’t forget’—which she would repeat 
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and begin adding to it. It will end, it will end, she said. It will come, it will come, 
when suddenly she added, We are in the hands of the Lord. (To the Lighthouse 
37) 
Apart from this obsession that Mrs. Ramsey clearly has with the supposed permanency of 
the adolescent mind, she insists upon the importance of adapting one’s adult behavior for 
the purpose of presumably protecting the child from his own memories. Through the eyes 
of Mrs. Ramsey, “…children never forget. For this reason, it was so important what one 
said, and what one did, and it was a relief when they went to bed” (To the Lighthouse 36). 
  This example from the novel illustrates a few key things about the interaction of 
this work with our analysis of memory. Foremost, Mrs. Ramsey projects a particular 
conviction throughout all of these lines regarding the fact that children never forget. The 
obsessive nature portrays a sense of urgency, one that when put in the context of her 
actual words suggests that it is an urgency to protect the children from possible 
implications of never forgetting. Overall, her tone tells us that there is a problem with the 
apparent fact that children never forget. Let us look to Mrs. Ramsey saying that one must 
simply wait for the child to go to bed. In doing so, she implies that the role of the adult is 
to shield the severities of the collective reality from the child. Once the child goes to bed, 
once he is no longer in the room, the adults may interact with their reality without 
precautions. Although, as Mrs. Ramsey says, it is a relief when the children go to bed 
because their memories are no longer in danger, suggesting that certain memories carry a 
loss of innocence. The relief of children in bed is relief in knowing that the children are 
no longer susceptible to memories and experiences that will never leave their minds.  
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 In speaking of the child who never forgets, we are not really speaking of the child 
who forever remembers the time his father did not let him visit the lighthouse. No, rather 
we are actually talking about the child who was corrupted by the negative emotions that 
came along with his disappointment of his father not permitting him to visit the 
lighthouse. It is not a coincidence that Mrs. Ramsey frets about her son remembering this 
moment as opposed to another. For the child, his father denying him the chance to visit 
the lighthouse that he so desires to see marks an obvious moment of disappointment and 
perhaps despair. Mrs. Ramsey does not worry about her son “never forgetting” moments 
of joy because they become moments of positive shaping. However, memories with 
negative associations mature the child’s mind and in doing so bring him farther and 
farther away from his individual sphere of reality and closer to the collective sphere of 
reality. By this suggestion, Mrs. Ramsey clearly recognizes this collective sphere of 
reality to be much different from Nabokov’s perfect world created by his earliest 
impressions. The collective sphere of reality can arguably not ever be so perfect as that of 
the individual because of its very nature of collectivity, the myriad of restructured 
individual experience is bound to become disjointed within such a packed space. Perhaps 
his mind will remember the actually incident with his father, although perhaps not, but 
neither is important in the grand scheme of the child “never forgetting.” What the child 
actually retains from the expanse of his existence is this corruption that results from the 
memory. The mind of the child is supple; therefore, to say that it “never forgets” is really 
to point to the fact that it starts to absorb corruptive aspects of negative experiences with 
the collective sphere. These memories that the child “never forgets” is what he becomes.  
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 When living within a society, it is an inevitability that the individual will 
eventually enter into the collective sphere of realty. It is simply unavoidable. Because of 
this, Mrs. Ramsey’s reaction to her son’s “never forgetting” seems a bit extreme. She 
knows that her son will eventually come to be a parcel of this corrupted world. As hard as 
she tries, she cannot keep him innocent forever. Due to this reason, I believe there to be 
an inherent duality in this passage from To the Lighthouse. On one level, one that is more 
apparent and superficial, Mrs. Ramsey is worried about the well being of her child. 
However, I find it more fitting to interpret Mrs. Ramsey in this passage as reacting to her 
own personal experience of “never forgetting.” Seeing the possibility of her son falling 
from his individual sphere of reality into “corruption” causes Mrs. Ramsey to reflect in a 
way that forces her see herself. At this point in her life, Mrs. Ramsey surely has a 
nuanced perspective of the individual mind within the collective sphere of reality, and 
thus can surely see its problematic nature. Her frantic and obsessive response, then, is 
really a delayed reaction to her own mental maturation and realization that she has fallen 
victim to those childhood memories that she can never forget.  
Turning now to The Sound and the Fury, we find that the impacts that Benjy’s 
first memory has on his mind are remarkable. As already stated, the moment created and 
defined particular environmental stimuli as necessary for perceiving future moments of 
reality. The theory of ecological perspective explains a natural neurobiological process 
that occurs in all infants throughout their development of forming memories, a process 
that substantiates Benjy’s memory of Damuddy’s funeral. The ecological perspective 
states that,  
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…at each point in development, infants of all species epitomize a successful 
evolutionary adaptation…[where] they rapidly learn the relationships that define 
their niche and confer survival and reproductive advantage…To meet each new 
set of ecological demands, infants select particular aspects of episodes to learn 
and remember until their niche changes again. (Rovee-Collier and Cuevas 168) 
Following this theory of ecological perspective, Benjy retained details from this memory 
in order to understand his surroundings. At the moment of Damuddy’s funeral, Benjy’s 
ecological perspective defined him as an intellectual equal to his peers. The 
understanding that Benjy gained solely from this memory was altered at a later point in 
his life by accommodation, but the particular details of the episode remain in Benjy’s 
consciousness. The theory of ecological perspective states that the child selects elements 
of the episode for the sake of understanding his environment. The theory then implies 
that the child maintains the episodic aspects until he redefines the image of his 
environment. In the case of Benjy, I think it most appropriate to follow this theory 
loosely. By examining his narrations, we find that Benjy preserves the episodic details of 
this first memory throughout his life. Rather than dismissing primary details, as the 
ecological perspective would suggest, Benjy’s use of them compounds his initial concept 
of reality. Despite mild transformation of his conceptual reality, Benjy continues to 
respond to stimuli from his first memory. We see Benjy state the phrase, “Caddy smelled 
like trees” through out his thirty years of narration. His conceptual reality evolves from 
the point of Damuddy’s funeral, but he maintains his initial markers for memory 
selection.  
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To answer the question of the relationship between the mind’s selectivity of 
memory and the conceptual reality, we need to understand which article the mind forms 
first. The mind begins to retain memories at some point after the age of 18 to 24 months. 
The neural underpinnings that are responsible for encoding, storage, consolidation, 
retention, and retrieval of memories for our experience develop very early in life, prior to 
the point at which the mind can store memories; however, our experiences are not 
available to later conscious recollection unless formed sometime after 18 to 24 months 
(“On the Importance of Studying Early Memory” 6-7). Mark L. Howe explains that, “the 
emergence of memory early in life is essential to the flexibility with which infants adapt 
and learn about their environment” (Howe 6). The emergence of memories is a 
fascinating point in the life of every human that arguably marks the point at which the 
infant has enough of an understanding of reality to nominate sensations into mental 
perceptions.  
Memories that form early on in development are usually fragile and rapidly 
forgotten, a phenomenon referred to as childhood amnesia (Li et al. 2). Li et al. pose a 
question that is directly related to Mrs. Ramsey’s passage, “Specifically, if early 
experiences cannot be explicitly recalled, how can they influence an individual’s 
functioning later in life” (Li et al. 3). The authors claim their question to remain 
unanswered, however qualify it by saying “there is an overwhelming amount of evidence 
supporting the idea that early experiences are critical for later functioning” (Li et al. 3). It 
is possible that infantile memories exist later on in development in “traces,” suggesting 
that at least some parts of these “forgotten memories” exist beyond the point in time 
where the memory is overtly expressed, being childhood and infancy (Li et al. 4). Studies 
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have shown that an enduring memory trace from an infantile or adolescent experience 
can influence subsequent behavior despite a lack of consciousness of the experience 
(Frankland et al. 5). Still other studies have suggested that infantile forgetting is due to 
retrieval failure, however, this is not an accurate explanation for all cases of infantile 
amnesia (Frankland et al. 4). Li et al. proposed infantile forgetting to occur through two 
phases. In the first phase, “the memory is no longer explicitly expressed, but can be 
recovered if an appropriate reminder treatment is given prior to test” (Li et al. 8). With 
this said, if the memory remains in a dormant state for long enough, it could decay to the 
point where it is no longer represented in the brain. In other words, infantile forgetting 
can be due to retrieval failure or storage failure (Li et al. 10).  
Freud first used the term “Infantile amnesia” over 100 years ago to refer to the 
early period in life “when memories that are formed tend to be short-lived or become 
inaccessible after a relatively short time frame” (“Infantile Amnesia in Human and 
Nonhuman Animals” 1-2).  “Infantile amnesia” refers most particularly to the human’s 
inability to remember early experiences as maturation unfolds (“Infantile Amnesia in 
Human and Nonhuman Animals” 2). As previously mentioned, the brain has all of the 
facilities to form memories prior to when infantile amnesia subsides; however, there is an 
absence of external basis of environmental understanding that prevents any working 
memory from forming into a long-term memory. Howe argues that the termination of 
infantile amnesia “like changes in other areas of memory, is most likely controlled by 
alternations in the basic processes of encoding, storage, consolidation, retentions, and 
retrieval that drive memory across development….” (3) In between birth and the age of 
approximately two years, the child gains some sort of ability that allows his memory to 
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fully function. In order for memory to properly form and function, the mind needs to 
contain a foundation on which to create the memory; that is to say, the mind needs to first 
have a comprehension of the implications of all sensations. For this to occur, the mind 
needs to have an understanding of language in order to give a label to various sensations.  
Without language, the mind would have no sense of markings on which to 
substantiate stimuli. The formation of language should suggest an additional layering of 
one’s conceptual reality. Arguably, it is the formation of a conceptual reality that allows 
the child to form memories. Howe states that, “Of course, it is not clear what such 
narrative comparisons tell us about memory of those experiences…can be talked about 
once language has developed” (“On the Importance of Studying Early Memory” 2). The 
stage of infantile amnesia ends with the ability to form memories based on techniques of 
linguistic labeling. Howe later states that, “for humans, the period of infantile amnesia is 
also one in which language skills are relatively impoverished; and the acquisition of 
language was thought by some to herald the end of infantile amnesia” (“Infantile 
Amnesia in Human and Nonhuman Animals” 11). The end of infantile amnesia marks the 
formation of the conceptual reality. Society has constructed the child at this point so that 
he has a well enough grasp of language on which to then create his notion of his world.  
 Siroj Sorajjakool explains that the infant, the being without a concept of reality, 
is driven by “unconscious instinctual needs” (Sorajjakool 154).  She then goes on to 
argue that,  
The infants identify themselves with the perception of the world…Life at this 
level lacks conflicts. The emergence of conflicts takes place when children learn 
to distinguish themselves from the external world and others surrounding them. 
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This emergence of consciousness is also the emergence of the ego-self…I believe 
that the ego is there for the purpose of interacting with the external world, the 
external reality. Through the interaction between the child and the external reality 
comes the formation of a belief system. (Sorajjakool 154) 
With the emanation of the “ego-self,” the individual is then able to interact with his 
environment in a way that allows him to understand the world from the place that he has 
within it. The concept of self-identity is critical in a person’s concept of his world or his 
reality. Growth of comprehension best occurs through comparative approaches by which 
the individual must first be able to identity himself as part of the world before he can 
understand the world itself. Sorajjakool denotes her “belief system” to represent the same 
entity as the “conceptual reality.” Sorajjakool’s “belief system” encompasses the 
individual’s understandings, perceptions, thoughts, feelings, and images of the world, as 
does the conceptual reality. With this parallel drawn, Sorajjakool then states that, “the 
belief system becomes the filter through which the child sees the world” (Sorajjakool 
154). The individual first inherits his notion of reality, what the world is and what the 
world is supposed to be, and the rest of his perceptions are filtered through this notion. 
His concept of reality born from his conceit to the ego-self directs his perceptions—his 
perceptions, which become his memories. 
 To better understand infantile amnesia, we must also understand the development 
of the infantile mind.  Doing so will help us better understand how the mind constructs its 
image of reality. Piaget writes, “To understand how the budding intelligence constructs 
the external world, we must first ask whether the child, in its first months of life, 
conceives and perceives things as we do, as objects that have substance, that are 
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permanent and of constant dimensions” (Piaget 1). The idea of memory development and 
the construction of a patterning reality really come down to first rely upon the 
development of a scheme of perception, as Piaget alludes to in these lines. In order for the 
child to remember, as with any individual, he must be able to perceive and interpret these 
perceptions in a way that the mind understands. In many respects, perception is 
dependent upon labels and language, as evidenced by the fact that infantile amnesia 
begins to significantly fade with the outset of linguistic learning (Piaget 20). Piaget 
alludes to the notion of object permanence in the above lines, being the understanding 
that objects continue to exist when we they cannot be observed (Piaget 39). Object 
permanence, a key part in mental development, is really the remembrance of an object, 
the ability to “perceive” an object when it is not present; but it order for one to remember 
an object one must first know what the object is. Meaning, that one must have the 
language to not only label but to describe the object. Without such language, the mind 
cannot make sense of the reality in which this object exists. This very much gets back to 
the idea we discussed in the previous chapter of conventional language. While  
conventional, and really collective, language may prevent the mind from fully 
understanding its reality. The mind also would be entirely unable to perceive details of 
this reality without some semblance of the language that the reality uses itself. 
 Piaget explains that object concept is far from innate and is constructed in stages, 
of which he outlines six. The first stage, reflex schema stage (0-1 months), marks the 
earliest moments of the development during which the baby learns how the body can 
move and work. Vision is blurred, the attention span is short at best, and object 
permanence is completely absent from the mind during this stage. Primary circular 
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reactions stage (1-4 months) is the point at which babies first notice objects and begin to 
follow their movements. Babies will continue to look where the object once stood after it 
has been removed, although this lasts for only a few seconds (Piaget 20). This stage is 
especially marked by responses to familiar images and sounds and anticipatory reactions 
to familiar events, thus indicated that the infants’ reactions become less reflexive and 
more purposeful (Piaget 25). At 4-8 months the infant will move into the secondary 
circular reactions stage when he will begin to reach for an object that is partially hidden; 
however, if the object is completely hidden, the child will make no attempt. It is believed 
that the infant learns to coordinate vision and comprehension during this stage, though 
novel behaviors are not yet imitated (Piaget 38). The fourth stage (8-12 months), 
coordination of secondary circular reactions, is deemed the most important stage for 
cognitive development. It is at this time that the child learns causality. Object 
permanence appears, as the child beings to retrieve an object when it is entirely concealed 
(Piaget 44). During the fifth stage (12-18 months), tertiary circular reaction, the child is 
able to retrieve an object when it is hidden several times in varying locations, but cannot 
locate it when it is outside of the perceptual field (Piaget 48). The sixth stage, invention 
of new means through mental combination (18-24 months), marks full development of 
object permanence (Piaget 50).  
 Though this sixth and final stage by no means marks the end of infantile 
development, it does show the need for the mind to understand spatial and temporal 
concepts when forming memories and understanding its reality. As Piaget claims, “The 
problem is closely connected with that of space. A world without objects would not 
present the character of spatial homogeneity and of coherence in displacements that 
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marks our universe” (Piaget 2). Looking to an application of this idea, we saw in the first 
chapter that a great deal of Benjy’s associative markers are defined by tangible objects, 
objects which presumably define a portion of his reality. Thus, in order for Benjy to 
understand the reality, he needs first to understand these objects, and then to perceive 
them later on in life. As discussed, the scene of the schoolgirls marks a crucial point in 
Benjy’s life in that it was a distinct shift in his reality. Caddy arguably acts as one of 
these markers that define Benjy’s reality. Once she left, his notion of the world was 
confused, and so we saw him trying to grab onto different, yet somewhat similar objects, 
for the purpose of redefining his reality.  
Benjy describes the “thrashing trees” through a collective first person subject—
“We could hear the tree thrashing,” “The tree quit thrashing. We looked up into the 
branches” (The Sound and the Fury 30). This voice is extremely atypical in any narration 
that Benjy gives. Rarely does he employ “we” over the “I.” In most instances he narrates 
from a voice that seems to be an almost third person narrator. Not necessarily by choice, 
but Benjy’s narrations usually draw him as distant from the action. But in this first 
memory, Benjy stands together with his brothers and Versh, looking up at his sister. The 
peculiar use of the plural first person suggests Benjy’s feeling of camaraderie. At such a 
young age, people would yet to have defined his attributes as entirely “idiotic.” He was 
still just as “normal” as the other boys whom he was standing next to. This moment 
creates a reality in which Benjy was treated as a “normal” individual and not some 
blubbering idiot who can’t control his crying outbursts or recognize his own name. This 
impression of Benjy did not last long beyond this moment. It certainly ended well before 
he was five years old, as we will see at the moment when Benjy is renamed. However, 
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this initial impression, while false in nature, did give Benjy an identity that aided in 
socially constructing his conceptual reality. The identity eventually disintegrated, but the 
recollection and obsession of the particular moment in which this identity was palpable 
suggests that the reality associated with this identity did not perish.  
Benjy creates his ego-self in two stages. His first memory of Damuddy’s funeral, 
as already discussed, adheres to his initial image of his ego-self. The distinction that the 
memory adheres to the image of the ego-self rather than creates the ego-self is crucial to 
make here. Benjy’s notion of ego-self had to have formed long before this moment. In 
order for a memory to form, the individual must hold a conceptual reality, which 
develops after they have gathered his ego-self. This memory simply represents the first 
stage of formation of Benjy’s ego-self. The second stage of his ego-self compounds upon 
the image formed at the very end of his period of infantile amnesia, a stage that is 
represented through the memory that Benjy has of his renaming.  
 Benjy’s mother decides to rename him in late 1900 when he is around the age of 
five (Stewart Backus 444), which occurs approximately two years after Damuddy’s 
funeral. This scene, like most others in Benjy’s narrative, appears in parts. The first piece 
that Benjy tells of this moment is through the following conversation:  
 What you want to get her started for, Dilsey said. 
 Whyn’t you keep him out of there. 
He was just looking at the fire, Caddy said. Mother was telling him his new name. 
we didn’t mean to get her started. 
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I knows you didn’t, Dilsey said. Him at one end of the house and her at the other. 
You let my things alone, now. Don’t you touch nothing till I get back. (The Sound 
and the Fury 56) 
This first description only alludes to the moment of his renaming. Benjy doesn’t 
explicitly describe the moment itself until a few pages later. This removed description 
still presents a stimulating detail that Benjy took from the experience. “He was just 
looking at the fire.” The image of fire, bright glowing objects, pervades Benjy’s 
narration. The following description of his name-change reappears a page after the first. 
This time the description is void of any allusion to the renaming itself. We can only 
conclude that this description is referencing the name-change scene because of the 
details. 
This separation of the telling of the memory, and really allusion to the actual 
memory its self, demonstrates a present time narrative partitioning of a singular memory. 
Arguably, the partitioning of Benjy’s memory illuminates the particular stimuli from the 
memory that guide Benjy’s perceptions later in life. When reading the following 
description of the name-change scene, the last two lines hold particular importance in the 
objects that Benjy developed as markers of his reality. 
I could hear the clock, and I could hear Caddy standing behind me, and I could  
hear the roof. It’s still raining, Caddy said. I hate rain. I hate everything. And 
then her head came into my lap and she was crying, holding me, and I began to 
cry. Then I looked at the fire again and the bright, smooth shapes went again. I 
could hear the clock and the roof and Caddy. (The Sound and the Fury 57) 
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This is very clearly a moment of overt emotional distress. His sensations are guiding the 
narration to the point where Benjy himself seems to be an esoteric figure. The cognitive 
processes of consciously selecting stimuli from his environment are entirely absent. 
Instead, the details of the clock, and the rain, and the fire, all seem to come into his 
consciousness with a sort of confusion. All of these stimuli are simply present without 
Benjy’s ability to comment on why or how. His mind has selected these particular stimuli 
from its subconscious concept of reality.  
 At the moment of his renaming, Benjy inarguably alters his notion of ego-self. 
Following the argument made by Sorajjakool, Benjy’s conceptual realty would evolve 
with a change in his ego-self. From the portions of Benjy’s narration that temporally 
proceed the moments of Damuddy’s funeral and Benjy’s name-change, we can see that 
the conceptual reality that resulted from the joining of these two moments distinctly 
selects memories for the purpose of supporting the conceived notion of the world. 
Benjy’s memory of “the gate scene,” which happened around 1910 (Pryse 43), 
epitomizes the guidance of Benjy’s selective reality. The two memories of Damuddy’s 
funeral and Benjy’s renaming exhibit a clear thought in Benjy’s mind of Caddy as a 
maternal figure. Benjy has a decisive connection to Caddy—a phenomenon that was 
arguably born from the moment when Benjy was looking up at Caddy while she sat in the 
tree and when Caddy comforted Benjy in the midst of his crisis with his ego-self. The 
gate scene only occurred because of Benjy’s desire to see Caddy. The desire for the 
object defines the object itself. Therefore, Benjy’s desire to see Caddy, who is an 
important stimulus in his conceptual reality, confabulated her existence for the purpose of 
appeasing the emotional desire and supporting Benjy’s notion of the world.  
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 The stimuli born from Benjy’s selective memory plagues his reality often times to 
the point of self-imposed disturbance. The marked stimuli categorize all sensations that 
enter Benjy’s brain. The brain then selects which sensations to perceive based off of the 
encoded guides of the conceptual reality; however, certain sensations will not always 
properly depict the esoteric world. The mind is so conditioned to associate certain stimuli 
with particular meanings, that it will often times misguide itself for the appeasement of 
desire. This gets back to the idea of Piaget’s theory of “operational thought.” Piaget’s 
accommodation, implicit in the theory of “operational thought,” is the result of the 
mind’s conditioning. As Piaget theorized, the mind fits new information to an already 
contained notion of reality. The gate scene in The Sound and the Fury perfectly 
demonstrates this phenomenon.  
They came on. I opened the fate and they stopped, turning. I was trying to say, 
and I caught her, trying to say, and she screamed and I was trying to say and 
trying and the bright shapes began to stop and I tried to get out. I tried to get it off 
of my face, but the bright shapes were going again. They were going up the hill to 
where it fell away and I tried to cry. But when I breathed in, I couldn’t breathe out 
again to cry, and I tried to keep from falling off the hill and I fell off the hill into 
the bright, whirling shapes. (The Sound and the Fury 53)  
The image of the “bright, whirling shapes” relates to Benjy’s memory of his renaming 
when staring at the fire. Benjy is experiencing a moment of sensory overload that 
arguably resulted from his mind’s confusion of the supposed purpose of the marked 
stimuli against the actually design of the episodic stimuli. His mind is so conditioned to 
assume all sensations of fiery or bright objects to indicate one thing—the epitome of 
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Benjy’s conceptual reality—that when his present experience fails to properly associate 
with memories that did meet the conditions of his social reality, and thus he cannot 
comprehend his present. The question now stands if the mind intentionally misguides 
itself in accommodation or if new information is subconsciously altered.  
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The Divide between Reality and Collective Memory and Individual Memory 
 
As already alluded to, there are distinct guiding principles of association that 
connect Benjy’s narration despite its disjointed chronological order. These principles of 
association will ultimately elucidate the relationship between Benjy’s memory and 
conceptual reality, but we must first consider the elements of any reality. What is Benjy’s 
reality? How does the reality defined Benjy’s persona? What formed his conception of 
reality? In her article entitled, Theories of Personality: Interpretations of Reality and the 
Formation of Personality, Siroj Sorajjakool asserts that the key to understanding human 
personality is not in reality itself, but that the act of grasping reality leads to the formation 
of personality (Sorajjakool 144). There are many different theories on what reality 
actually is. All theories do contend that whatever reality is, it is a subjective experience. 
Plato suggests that reality can be described through the notion that the “idea” of a chair is 
the real chair itself and every concrete chair is only the representation of the real 
(Sorajjakool 144). This would implicate that the mind attempts to “fit” every image that 
the brain perceives into a preconditioned image of what that “real” object is.  
The concept of reality defines perception, but our conception of reality is also a 
personal construct. Immanuel Kant postulated that reality is the “thing-in-itself” 
(Sorajj145). Sorajiakool describes Kant’s theory in regards to reality: 
Our understanding of reality is our personal construct. There is, for Kant, no 
knowledge without sensations, and therefore all we can know is not the thing-in-
itself but that which we perceive through sensations. All we perceive are 
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sensations of the thing-for-itself, but never the thing-in-itself. Nevertheless, the 
mind is not something passive which merely awaits the registration of sensation 
upon it…The mind is active. It actively organizes different information received 
through sensations into the phenomenal world. This innate, dynamic aspect of 
mind Kant calls the a piori...We live in a real world but we interact with the world 
as perceived by us. (Sorajjakool145) 
The mind works to fit all sensations and perceptions of environmental stimuli into a 
collective image of what the mind already believes the world to be. The mind seeks to 
gratify a desire to fulfill the notion of what is reality. In order to do so, it selects 
sensations from the environment based off of this preconceived notion of reality. All 
sensations and perceptions are directed at corroborating this notion.  
The inherent dependency between memory selection and one’s conceptual reality 
is fallible—Benjy’s memory of the gate scene proves exactly that. The possession, 
however, of a conceptual reality is unavoidable. The birth of a conceptual reality lies in 
what is referred to as, collective memory. One can think of a collective memory as a 
shared memory. As Avishai Margalit explains in his book, The Ethics of Memory, “A 
shared memory, on the other hand, is not a simple aggregate of individual memories. It 
requires communication. A shared memory integrates and calibrates the different 
perspectives of those who remember the episode” (Margalit 51). Arguably, collective 
memory imparts a desire in the human mind to communize the human experience. 
Historical precedent breeds a desire for shared experience, a concept congenital in 
collective memory. Humanity nurses its progenies to live by a conceptual reality. A 
conceptual reality, while individualized, is socially constructed. From the collective 
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memory generated by historical precedent, humanity, or society, propagates a technique 
for conditioning the minds of every individual. 
 Faulkner wrote with a clear consciousness of the social implications of his time. 
As previously mentioned, there were profound social studies at the time of the 
publication of The Sound and the Fury looking at the signs of idiocy. Susan Donaldson 
asserts that, “Faulkner, like so many other writers of his generation, had begun to look up 
from his own aesthetic preoccupations and become attuned to the social and economic 
misery engulfing his own community and that of the country at large” (Donaldson 105-
106). Faulkner infused relevant social and historical context into his character of Benjy. 
Yet even more important is the fact that historical and social contexts are impossible to 
avoid. Faulkner wrote with such a background because this background consumed him, 
just as it does every individual. The degree of consumption is certainly variably, but it is 
nonetheless universal.  
 In an attempt to better understand how one deals with the conceptual reality, 
Sorajjakool writes that,  
…every interpreter remains a contextual being who lives and moves within the 
bounds of socioeconomic, cultural, and psychological environments. Each seeks 
to understand the whole from a particular point, the infinite from the finite, the 
universal from the individual. Each possesses a drive to move beyond the 
environmental limitations, and, although one may achieve a great deal of this 
“beyondness” and objectivity, it is never a fully objective beyond. (Sorajjakool 
147) 
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The desire to understand and contend with the world is innate; however, the construction 
of how one is to come to his belief of understanding is not. A conceptual reality is 
purposed to force the individual to view the world through particular stipulations. The 
individual creates the conceptual reality, but his unavoidable social context cultivates him 
to construct his reality in a certain manner. 
The mind selects memories from a preconceived notion of reality. This conceptual 
reality is an inherent part of the human experience—social governances construct the 
child based off of predetermined criteria to bare a notion of his world. The collective 
memory established the principles of social construction by recalling important 
experiences and beliefs from history that where critical to the human experience at the 
time. Individual memories, such as those that we see in Benjy’s section of The Sound and 
the Fury, comprise the collective memory. The process is thus entirely cyclical in nature: 
the individual selects and creates memories based off of classifications that the 
conceptual reality marked. The conceptual reality is a product of social principles of 
construction, all of which the collective memory draws. The collective memory goes 
back to the individual to extrapolate and conjoin individual memories into a shared 
memory of the human existence. 
Individual memory has pervaded our discussion up until this point. What we need 
to realize is that individual memory is complemented by the existence of collective 
memory, both of which are inextricably tied. And so at this point, we shall turn to 
collective memory for the sake of exposing the origins of individual memory as well as 
certain manipulating forces. Maurice Halbwachs was a French philosopher and 
sociologist who is considered to be the father of collective memory. It is in this chapter 
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where the concepts and principals of collective memory will prevail discussion. To start 
off on collective memory, I start with Halbwachs and his questioning of what would exist 
in the absence of a collectivized influence on memory, where all memory is entirely 
subjective and individualized to the mind’s holder. “What is the model of the purely 
individual state of consciousness? It is the image—detached from the word, to the extent 
that it refers to the individual and the individual alone” (Halbwachs 170). This image 
would be something without context, or a context that derives only from what the 
individual mind can organically interpret from its immediate environment. “This image is 
the abstraction made from the general significations of all that surrounds this individual, 
from relations and ideas: that is, from all those social elements that we decided at the 
beginning of our hypothesis to disregard” (Halbwachs 170). An image cannot derive 
from the body—its origin lies where the object of the mind’s perception stood. Because 
an image cannot derive from the body, “it can be explained only by itself” (Halbwachs 
170). But surely an image never explains itself.  
 As we discussed in the previous chapter, language creates meaning from a 
previously written interpretation. Despite the fact that this definition must be subjective 
and unique to the original mind, a society adopts it as communal. As we have discussed, 
the mind remembers through means of this language. No memory, therefore, is without 
the authority of social context. We shall never require an image to explain itself because 
as Halbwachs so argues in the introduction to his On Collective Memory, “one may say 
that memory depends on social environment” (Halbwachs 37). A great deal of this is due 
to fact that people normally acquire their memories while physically in a social setting; 
however, and more importantly, it is while in the society that people recall, recognize, 
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and localize their memories (Halbwachs 38). This now implies a great many things, the 
most important of which being that,associations, as alluded to in the first chapter, are 
entirely dependent upon a social context. This is to say, that while an individual past is 
important for the recollection of a memory and the success of association, the individual 
past cannot escape the hand of the social past. And this, for sake of argument, suggests 
that the degree to which the social past is dependent upon the individual past is largely 
skewed away from the society.  
 Chapter One talked about the process of individual memory formation through 
association. Association creates a memory framework for the individual memory. 
Following this idea, we now speak to the framework of a collective memory. As we saw 
in the opening of this passage, individual memory is entirely dependent upon collective 
memory. The mind interprets individual perception prior to memory formation from 
social teachings that bring a context on which to lay these interpretations. Contrarily, the 
collective memory is also dependent on the individual memory, for the collective is made 
up of individual memories. Halbwachs writes, “One can now concede, if one so desires, 
that various capacities for memory aid each other and are of mutual assistance to each 
other. But what we call the collective framework of memory would then be only the 
result, or sum, or combination of individual recollections of many members of the same 
society” (Halbwachs 39). Collective frameworks are dependent upon far more than a 
coalition of various individual memories. The frameworks of the collective are static 
throughout time, meaning that the precepts that determine selection are generally aspects 
dependent upon time. To this point, Halbwachs writes,  
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It is necessary to show, besides, that the collective frameworks of memory are not 
constructed after the fact by the combination of individual recollections; nor are 
they empty forms where recollections coming from elsewhere would insert 
themselves. Collective frameworks, are, to the contrary, precisely the instruments 
used by the collective memory to reconstruct an image of the past which is in 
accord, in each epoch, with the predominant thoughts of the society. (Halbwachs 
40) 
This distinction between the memory framework and the actual memory, especially in 
talk of collective memory, is critical. The collective framework determines what aspects 
of the respective epoch define the collective memory. While the details of collective 
memory are certainly temporally variant, the principles that bring them to memory are 
not.  
 Apart from the actual memories, the frameworks that create these memories 
within a social context are now important for us to understand as we move forward in this 
discussion of memory within the public sphere. By a collective framework, an individual 
memory would have to abide by certain thoughts that “flow according to the order which 
the thoughts of society follow in their course” (Halbwachs 44). Society thinks by 
totalities; it associates one notion to another and then groups these into complex 
representations of person and event, which in turn are comprised of still even more 
complex notions (Halbwachs 44). Collective memory then follows a framework similar 
to that of the human mind. Associations build to form memories that comprise this 
memory, or history of the community. The memories, themselves, are based entirely on 
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the happenings of history; however, historical events are also entirely dependent on 
memory.  
 The human inclination towards a conceptual reality is restricting. Memory 
selection, as instated by one’s conceptual reality, limits perception. Freud postulated that 
the mind delineates perceptions by deciding which events would result in “hostile 
memories” in the mind. Freud deemed this concept the “repression pathway,” where the 
simple difference in the storage of desirable and hostile memories was the creation of 
non-plastic and plastic synapses (The Art of Insight 56). By this theory, the mind simply 
blocks all memory circuits that are considered to contain hostile memories. Whether or 
not we believe Freud’s theory, his insight does suggest the neurobiological disposition to 
physically structure the brain in a way that only recognizes certain memories. The 
memories that the brain does recognize are selected by subjective denotations of “hostile” 
or “non-hostile.” In order for the brain to make these distinctions, it needs to first have a 
conceptual reality to infiltrate these categorizes.  
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Confabulation: The Transformation of Memory  
  
When examining a moment of memory told from the narration of the original 
subject, we must contend with many fallacies that structure any given memory. We can 
best understand the process of memory by breaking it down into parts. The first part is 
that of selection when the brain, which is designed to store information that will be useful 
at a later date, selects certain perceptions to transfer from working memory into long-
term memory.  All perceptions that are not selected pass through unnoted without leaving 
a mark on consciousness. Within the selection process, lay-down occurs, a step in which 
the selected experience is associated with relevant pre-existing memories and then 
retained for an appropriate period of time in order to enhance understanding furnished 
from both past and present memory. After the formation of long-term memory, the brain 
can call upon recollection, or the stimulation of memories, by associating that memory  
with present experience (Carter 154). Memories undergo a process of change each time 
they are recalled. Greg Miller theorizes that “it may be impossible for humans or any 
other animal to bring a memory to mind without altering it in some way” (Miller 2-3). 
The alteration of memory is referred to as confabulation.  
 Confabulation describes the materialization of memories and experiences that 
never happened (Nahum et. al 2524). The idea of confabulation is wildly important for 
our discussion as it gets to possible reasons of why certain memories may come to be 
falsified. As we shall come to find, even under the guise of confabulation, there are still a 
multitude of possibilities as to the existence of “unreal” memories. Before coming to 
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speak specifically about confabulation, we must realize that all people use their 
knowledge of the world to fill in missing elements of experience—details they were 
unable to perceive originally—when forming memories. This occurs during perception 
and again during recall (Johnson, Raye 137). If the individual is cognizant of the fact that 
he has filled in certain pieces of information, then we do not consider the memory to be 
distorted, only that the individual is making inferences from incomplete information 
(Johnson, Raye 137). If the individual comes to believe that the “fill-ins” actually 
occurred, the memory is falsified. Marcia Johnson and Carol Raye write that if the 
individual comes to believe a manufactured detail of a memory to be true there has then 
“been a failure of ‘reality monitoring,’ a failure to distinguish between perceived 
information and internally generated information in memory” (Johnson, Raye 137). 
“Source confusions” is an important term to the discussion of confabulation and refers to 
misattributions that include source and reality monitoring errors. Scientists have 
developed the source monitoring framework (SMF) to determine how people differentiate 
between what is real and what is false experience (Johnson, Raye 137). 
 As Johnson and Raye write, “there is no single piece of information that 
invariably marks a memory as an accurate reflection of the past” (Johnson, Raye 137). 
However, there are several ways in which scientists have taken to monitoring what 
individuals remember. Although, foremost, it is important to realize that construction 
does not necessarily imply that any information was lost from a memory, which is to say 
that perceptual representations and constructed understandings of events might persist in 
memory but are performed under entirely different conditions (Johnson, Raye 137). 
Typically, memories from different sources, be it spatial or temporal, differ in their 
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phenomenal qualities. Memories from experienced or external events typically include 
details of time, spatial arrangement, emotional response, sensory percepts, and 
participants. Whereas, memories of thoughts and imagined events typically have less 
lucid information to these points; however, they do tend to have more information on the 
cognitive processes involved—such as intention, planning, etc. (Johnson, Raye 138). 
SMF balances such differences by evaluating memories for their match with the expected 
characteristic from a given source. Memorial details are correct often enough to preserve 
our belief in the validity of reality, but can still prove to be incorrect.  
 Similarities between memories and products of the imagination are actually key 
factors in memorial confusions. Perceptual or semantic qualities of one memory that are 
activated in association with a similar imagined event can make the imagined event seem 
to be a memory from actual experience. Johnson and Raye explain to this point that 
“When events are highly similar, it is critical that encoding and consolidation processes 
incorporate (or bind) distinctive features into an episodic representation” (Johnson, Raye 
139). Interestingly enough, though perhaps not surprising, the information that the mind 
fills in is sometimes the information most likely to be remembered falsely. Even if at the 
time of generation, we know the inferences we are making to fill in memory holes to be 
false, we can likely forget the integrity of this information later on and recall it as a “real” 
detail (Johnson, Raye 139).  
 Examples of confabulations can vary in believability and purpose. It is quite 
possible and likely for some confabulations to resemble “real” memories. An early theory 
behind confabulation posited that “confabulation stresses the inability of confabulating 
patients to retrieve events in their appropriate temporal context” (Fotopoulou et al.  
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2180). This view suggests that those susceptible to confabulating may have lost their 
“temporal signposts” that normally allow individuals to “retrieve events in their proper 
temporal order and context” (Fotopoulou et al. 2180). This theory has since been revived 
in three different versions. Dalla Barba et al. suggest that confabulation is utilized by 
those who have lost the ability to establish personal temporal consciousness (Fotopoulou 
et al. 2180). Another theory suggests that those who confabulate their memories are 
unable to relate to their present and current reality. Lastly, Johnson et al. proposed that 
confabulation arises due to a reality monitoring deficit where individual cannot 
distinguish between “various past memories, as well as between real and imagined 
events” (Fotopoulou et al. 2180). Collectively, these theories suggest that spatial and 
temporal criteria of reality do not properly guide retrieval when memories are 
confabulated. We proposed a similar theory in Chapter Two in the context of the 
imagination. Because of this, it is important to clarify that imagined experiences and 
confabulated memories are not the same. An imagined experience comes from intentional 
and conscious doings of the mind; whereas, confabulations are be definition unintentional 
manipulations of a “real” experience.  
 In recent years, Armin Schinder proposed four different possible forms that 
confabulation can take. The first is the gap-filling account, which contends that 
“confabulations emanate from a desire to fill gaps in memory to avoid embarrassment” 
(Nahum et al. 2525). By this form, confabulations reflect a desire to embellish a situation 
of that was originally amiss or displeasing. This would speak to the ability of the 
emotional spheres of the mind to manipulate “reality” for the purpose of emotional 
pleasing. However, confabulations can and have been documented with dark content 
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(Nahum et al. 2525). Continuing forward, the executive hypothesis proposes that 
confabulations arise from the combination of amnesia with dysexecutive syndrome 
(Nahum et al. 2525). 9 The third theory, the monitoring hypothesis, holds that 
confabulations arise from impaired processes involved in “the evocation and monitoring 
of memories” (Nahum et al 2525). In this model, confabulations are the result of the 
activation of faulty memory followed by deficient monitoring of the recovered memory. 
Unlike the other two models, these confabulations are very much the results of post-
memory formation events and maintenance. The last hypothesized model relates back to 
the issues of temporal and spatial labeling. As the name suggests, the temporal hypothesis 
attributes confabulations to a disturbed sense of time and temporal relations in memory 
(Nahum et al 2525).  
 Having discussed confabulation at some length, it is fitting to turn to our literature 
and find confabulation’s application. At this point, simply due to the nature of this 
particular neurobiological subject and the nature of our literary examples, we take a 
slightly different approach. Confabulation stands by its definition as being an 
unconscious, unintentional falsification. For this reason, it is exceptionally difficult to 
identify confabulation within literature, as it may at times be in life. Particularly when 
looking to works of first person narrators as we have seen in The Sound and the Fury; 
Speak, Memory; and “That in Aleppo Once…,” it is nearly impossible to detect an 
                                                
9 Dysexecutive refers to a series of symptoms, usually resulting from brain damage, that 
are related to cognitive, behavioural, and emotional issues. The symptoms tend to present 
together. It was used to believed to affect only the frontal lobe of the brain. This theory 
no longer stands, but does speak to the truth that the frontal lobe is usually most affected. 
Many of the symptoms can be found to be direct results of impairment to the central 
executive component of working memory, which is responsible for control and inhibition 
(Nahum et al. 2527). 
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example of confabulation. Rather, we place the idea of confabulation within the context 
of literary examples such as these so that we may make a reader aware of the bias of the 
mind. The well-read reader knows of the possibility of narrator bias; however, the notion 
of confabulation speaks to the truth of the neuroaesthetic in that it may at times be 
impossible to determine the reality of the experience because the mind is capable and 
susceptible to changing the reality after it has passed. Thus, confabulation adds a level of 
reality to the mind. This is a level that conceives a reality that is not, but believes it to be 
just as valid as that which actually is. This level is a false reality protected by memory. 
We should find many parallels here between confabulation and the imagination. Both 
create “unreal” experience due to distasteful reality. We, however, must not read 
confabulation and imagination as the same. They employ distinct levels of consciousness 
and thus function under different parameters. Because the imagination works consciously 
and intentionally, it is aware of the problematic nature of the reality in which it works; 
whereas, confabulation recognizes the issues without conscious note to their existence. 
Perhaps we can say that the issues before the imagination are more glaring because of 
this reason; however, it would then also seem fair to argue that confabulation works to 
hide the most problematic issues from the mind before they can reach consciousness.  
With these notions of confabulation in mind, I turn to Faulkner’s short story, “A 
Rose for Emily.” A well-known Faulknerian piece, “A Rose for Emily” tells the story of 
the discovery of Homer Barron’s body forty years after it was assumed that he had 
deserted Emily Grierson. The townspeople discover the body after Emily’s death and find 
“what was left of him, rotted beneath what was left of the nightshirt, had become 
inextricable from the bed in which he lay; and upon him and upon the pillow beside him 
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lay that even coating of the patient and biding dust” (“A Rose for Emily” 6). This is a 
story in which the themes of the dust and decay prevail. Aubrey Binder writes, “but it is 
Faulkner’s use of dust imagery that provides the key to understanding the role of the past 
and the manner in which it lingers in the present” (Binder 5). This dust covers every 
object in Emily’s home, thus representing Emily as an archaic being. The image of the 
dust works to protect the past within the present, allowing the past to maintain its original 
prosperities that were once appropriate but now obsolete in the present. Really, the dust 
prevents decay, which changes and erodes objects of the past, allowing them to become 
relevant to the present. However, “dust covers but does not ruin” (Binder 5). As one 
coated in this dust, Emily is herself an individual who is temporally out of place in her 
society.  Her dust obscures her presence, as we see in the fact of her townspeople viewing 
her as an enigma. In doing so, we find Emily to be a figure of temporal and spatial 
confusion.  
 “Alive, Miss Emily had been a tradition, a duty, and a care; a sort of hereditary 
obligation upon the town” (“A Rose for Emily” 1). In decades past, Miss Emily was in 
some sense an icon, it seems. But the idea of tradition signifies unchanging qualities. In 
the context of Emily, these qualities show themselves to be rightly inappropriate for 
social living. Though more so than that, Emily refuses to acknowledge the changes made 
by the natural progression of time. We learn, for example, that in 1894 Colonel Sartoris, 
the mayor at the time, had invented a decree stating that Emily’s father had loaned money 
to the town, and because of this she was excused from paying taxes. Well this time 
passed, as did Colonel Sartoris, and Miss Emily’s paying of taxes became an issue, and 
so a deputation arrived at her door, after which the following ensues: 
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Her voice was dry and cold. “I have no taxes in Jefferson. Colonel Sartoris 
explained it to me. Perhaps one of you can gain access to the city records and 
satisfy yourselves.”  
“But we have. We are the city authorities, Miss Emily. Didn’t you get a notice 
from the sheriff, signed by him?” 
“I received a paper, yes,” Miss Emily said. “Perhaps he considers himself the 
sheriff…I have no taxes in Jefferson.” 
“But there is nothing on the books to show that, you see We must go by the—“ 
 “See Colonel Sartoris. I have no taxes in Jefferson.” 
 “But, Miss Emily—“ 
“See Colonel Sartoris.” (Colonel Sartoris has been dead almost ten years.) “I have 
no taxes in Jefferson. Tobe!” The Negro appeared. “Show these gentlemen out.” 
(“A Rose for Emily” 2)  
This moment is arguably the first in which Emily’s tendencies towards confabulation 
become apparent. Before, we discussed the issues that arise when attempting to locate 
moments of confabulation in fictional works that employ first person narrators. Faulkner 
wrote “A Rose for Emily” through an omnipotent narrator. That coupled with the issues 
of memory, reality, and time that Faulkner embeds in this story allow “A Rose for Emily” 
to be the perfect example in which to see confabulation in literature. When we return to 
the above passage, we cannot read Emily to be intentionally lying to the town officials for 
the sake of saving money; she rather seems to be delusional. Colonel Sartoris died ten 
years prior, yet she is adamant that the town officials must speak with him. Miss Emily 
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simply refuses to acknowledge any detail that does not please and corroborate the 
unwavering reality in her mind.  
 One may give the argument that Miss Emily is simply insane. The details of the 
story, however, indicate that Faulkner was writing a far more complex image. As we saw 
some pages ago, one possible explanation for confabulation is the mind’s inability to 
recognize temporal markers. Possibly, Faulkner creates Emily as the extreme epitome of 
this idea. She is a “tradition” but one that is so entrenched in the past that she cannot 
function in the reality of her time. The memories that her mind forms from the experience 
of her should-be-present take the details of the collective memory framework of the 
present, a framework that directs the actions of the society, and attempt to bend them to 
her own individual memory framework, which is operating under drastically different 
principles of time. The result is delusion. Yet she continues on in her own past. “Thus she 
passed from generation to generation—dear, inescapable, impervious, tranquil, and 
perverse” (“A Rose for Emily 5). However, refusing changes, or denying changes, really 
only presents issues for Emily due to the inescapable company of her society. For 
example, Faulkner writes, 
Then the newer generation became the backbone and the spirit of the town, and 
the painting pupils grew up and fell away and did not send their children to her 
with boxes of color and tedious brushes and pictures cut from the ladies’ 
magazines. The front door closed upon the last one and remained closed for good. 
When the town got free postal delivery, Miss Emily alone refused to let them 
fasten the metal numbers above her door and attach a mailbox to it. She would not 
listen to them. (“A Rose for Emily” 5) 
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In part, Emily’s confabulations are heavily due to her inability to recognize time, reasons 
for which we will come to disclose shortly. However, had Emily been able to avoid the 
gaze of her collective, she would have no issue with time. Time only appears through the 
device of the collective; thus confabulation only proves necessary when the individual 
mind is under influence or in the presence of a collective.  
What we then discover about “A Rose for Emily” is that the inability of the mind 
to recognize temporal makers can only cause confabulation when the mind is in 
conjunction with the collective memory framework. This is also to say, that time only 
exists outside the individual mind. Pages ago, we concluded that the mind must recognize 
temporal markers in order to accurately process experience into memory. To say that time 
only exists outside of the individual mind does not refute this conclusion, despite what it 
may seem. Rather, we see that the mind needs temporal markers because the experiences 
exist within the collective framework. Therefore, in order to interpret and process the 
details of these experiences, the mind needs to abide by the principles that created the 
details.  
The moment of Emily denying the death of her father is one of the sadder 
moments of the story and the most crucial for understanding the reasons for her 
confabulation. Faulkner writes, 
The day after his death all the ladies prepared to call at the house and offer 
condolence and aid, as is our custom. Miss Emily met them at the door, dressed as 
usual and with no trace of grief on her face. She told them that her father was not 
dead. She did that for three days, with the ministers calling on her, and the 
doctors, trying to persuade her to let them dispose of the body. Just as they were 
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about to resort to law and force, she broke down, and they buried her father 
quickly.  (“A Rose for Emily” 3) 
The death of her father surely marks a moment of intense emotional response, and despite 
denying her father’s death the towns people “did not say she was crazy then. We believed 
she had to do that. We remembered all the young men her father had driven away, and we 
knew that with nothing left, she would have to cling to that which had robbed her, as 
people will” (“A Rose for Emily” 3).  
 So rather than being crazy, Emily responded naturally. Her creation of a false 
reality in which her father was still alive calmed her emotions. It appeased her mind so 
that she may continue living in a reality that was satisfying. The death of her father was 
chronologically the beginning of Emily’s confabulation. Once the townspeople buried her 
father, she was sick for some time. Then the summer after, Emily met Homer Barron, to 
which the narrator says, “at first we were glad that Miss Emily would have an interest, 
because the ladies all said, ‘Of course a Grierson would not think seriously of a 
Northerner, a day laborer.’ But there were still others, older people, who said that even 
grief could not cause a real lady to forget noblesse oblige” (“A Rose for Emily 4)10. 
Forgetting is a device to assuage the emotional truths of a harmful reality. Really, 
forgetting is no different than confabulation. We find Emily to insist upon remaining in 
past. In doing so, she forgets or denies the continuation of the reality that occurred past 
her point of emotional distress. Emily’s confabulations leave her in a moment, one that is 
really void of temporal markers, before the death of her father. Arguably, the emotional 
                                                
10 Noblesse oblige is the concept that nobility extends beyond entitlements and requires 
the individual with such status to fulfill social responsibilities (Binder 7).  
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trauma of her father’s death was so severe that her mind altered the truth before she 
became aware and in doing so forever prevented the progression of Emily’s reality.  
 And so Emily’s mind stuck her in a steadfast, false reality. As previously 
mentioned, the case of Emily is extreme. The mind often does not go as far in its 
confabulations to reach all aspects of reality, but the extremities of this case allow us to 
see the rational of falsification. Emily’s emotional dependency on her father returns to 
her earliest impressions and parallels Benjy’s obvious need for his sister Caddy. When 
the minds of both Emily and Benjy were at their earliest stages of defining reality, they 
fixated upon the existence of their father and their sister, respectively. Because these 
moments occurred more or less simultaneously, the father and the sister came to mark the 
realities of which Emily and Benjy were first accustomed. As we concluded in Chapter 
One, the memories acquired from these realities act as the framework for all individual 
memories; the conceptual realties developed during these early stages of development 
work in the same manner. And so, when such large defining markers of reality disappear, 
what is the mind to do? For Emily, her mind is to refute the change in reality. It ignores 
the evolution for sake of maintaining an emotional equilibrium where the mind is still 
supported by all that it knows to be true, for certainly, once the markers of reality change, 
the reality changes. And once the reality changes, all of the mind’s memories become 
obsolete.  
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Conclusion 
Why Memory Believes Before Knowing Remembers 
 
 
In Faulkner’s Absalom and Absalom, Rosa Coldfield claims that there is no such 
thing as memory because it is most often incorrect and false—“that is the substance of 
remembering—sense, sight, smell: the muscles with which we see and hear and feel—not 
mind, not thought: there is no such thing as memory: the brain recalls just what the 
muscles grope for: no more, no less: and its resultant sum is usually incorrect and false 
and worthy only of the name of dream” (Absalom and Absalom 143). Such an assertion 
claims that the brain has little or no power to bring back the past, and yet it does, or tries. 
Coldfield does not claim that the brain holds no image of the past. Instead she suggests 
that the past ascribed as memory is faulty because it depends solely on the desires of the 
present brain. Are we to read all memory, then, as dependent upon nothing more than 
desire, desire that is ever changing with the shifts of space and time? Is desire not too 
inconsistent to be the determiner of the past? With the end of every action comes a new 
desire that will eventually dispense with the next. Desire is thus continuous, but in its 
continuation it is dynamic and shifting towards a point of satisfaction that in the grand 
scheme will never come. Surely, for this reason, if memory is determined to be just “what 
the muscles grope for,” then how is the resultant sum not to be “incorrect and false and 
worthy only of the name of a dream”? 
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 In a note about desire, Jacques Lacan suggested that “enjoyment comes from the 
repetition of the past because doing so represses the anxiety of lack” (Schreiber 71). This 
is to say that the repetition of history provides comfort by allowing the mind to know  
there to be an absence of uncertainty. “Lack” comes when the mind is aware that 
something is awry or simply missing. However, if the mind follows a predetermined 
pattern, one that is ensured by a fixture to repetition, there can be no lack, for the mind 
knows nothing in existence outside of the pattern. The pattern inscribes a framework in 
the mind of what is true and what is not, a reality in essence. Enjoyment, thus, comes 
from a strict adherence to a predetermined image of reality. Lacan elaborates by stating, 
Desire is a relation of beings to lack…It isn’t the lack of this of that, but lack of 
being whereby the best exists…Being comes into existence as an exact function 
of this lack. Being attains a sense of self in relation to being as a function of this 
lack, in the experience of desire….Relations between human beings are really 
established before one gets to the domain of consciousness. It is desire which 
achieves the primitive structuration of the human world, desire as unconscious. 
(Lacan 223-224) 
The society of the individual determines what the individual is to desire before the 
individual even reaches the point of emotional capabilities. By determining the collective 
framework of reality, as we discussed in Chapter Three, the collective indirectly 
determines what the individual is to desire. “Desire is a relation of beings to lack,” 
meaning that desire marks the comfort that the individual feels from knowing a certainty 
in regards to his own reality. At the same time, the desire of the collective is what 
structures the collective sense of reality. As Lacan says, “It is desire which achieves the 
 136 
primitive structuration of the human world,” suggesting that there must be a leveling of 
desire—those that are primitive, existing in the mind before any ordering of the collective 
reality and those that result from collective influence.  
 The second form of desire then really proves to be more of an adaptation forced 
upon the individual for the purpose of maintaining and protecting the collective 
framework of both memory and reality. The “desire” of repetition insures the 
continuation of the collective existence. Since this desire is learned after interaction with 
the reality that is to be repeated, we must see this form of “desire” as far from primitive 
because the mind learns this “desire.” We can question the place of true primitive 
desire—does it come to interact with learned desire? Is it ignored or reformed with the 
intrusion of social construction? We can rightly think of these primitive desires as we can 
think of our individual memories and the memories of our earliest impressions. Nabokov 
told us that the earliest impressions create our memorial platform on which all memories 
are to stand. However, after introduction into the collective reality, we constantly 
transform these earliest memories to meet the criteria of our spatial and temporal 
changes. As Halbwachs explains,  
We preserve memories of each epoch in our lives, and these are continually 
reproduced; through them, as by a continual relationship, a sense of our identity is 
perpetuated. But precisely because these memories are repetitions, because they 
are successively engaged in very different systems of notions, at different periods 
of our lives, they have lost the form and the appearance they once had. 
(Halbwachs 31) 
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Our earliest impressions do form the memorial platform, as Nabokov suggests in Speak, 
Memory, but with increased exposure to an esoteric world, the parts of this foundation are 
constantly altered to maintain its initial structure or notion of reality. To be clear, this 
foundation of reality is the reality of the collective sphere. During early stages of life and 
development, this collective reality is complemented by an individually-created reality. 
As the individual mind progresses throughout time, the individual reality weakens and 
loses relevance.  
In early chapters we discussed how repetition helps increase the prospect of the 
experience settling into long-term memory. Repeated recall of the experience once it has 
become memory creates the scenario we see presented by Halbwachs. Each time the 
mind recalls a memory it does so within a distinct temporal and spatial context. This 
context, as we have mentioned before, affects the manner in which this memory is 
interpreted upon recall. With varying contexts comes varying interpretations, and these 
interpretations then become part of the memory. This means that every time the mind 
recalls an experience, it alters its memory ever so slightly, leading to the loss of “the form 
and appearance they once had.” 
 As the mind then develops to a social standard of collective memory, the 
individual memories stray farther and farther from their original reality. Should this lead 
us to say that as the mind develops it becomes more inclined towards the imagination for 
the purpose of clarifying the inherent confusion of a false reality? Nabokov suggests the 
opposite to be true—one becomes further removed from genius as one progresses away 
from the earliest impressions. When one is in the earliest stages of development, he is 
most removed from his society due to an inclination to imagine. The collective reality is 
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at best a foreign concept, and all that is real depends solely on what the innocent mind 
perceives. Additionally, memories do not form at this time because the mind is ignorant 
to language. Simply, the mind is in a floating state where there is nothing real but nothing 
that is unreal, for no words exists to label such. Then slowly the mind learns a few words. 
Object permanence solidifies, and the mind can call upon an object from memory, but 
first, collective reality tells this maturing mind what it should call the object. In doing so, 
the mind begins its induction into this collective reality. The more time that passes from 
this entrance into the collective sphere, the more the genius dies. From time to time a 
strong mind may perceive issues within this collective reality, and it will then return to its 
genius state. But as the mind ages, it loses its strength. This weakness dismantles the 
level of consciousness that was once able to question the validity of the collective reality. 
The more the mind ages, the more time it spends saturated in the collective reality. 
Eventually, it becomes saturated to a point where the integrity of the individual reality 
framework completely disintegrates. What is left is a mind at the full mercy of collective 
repetition for the sake of desire, and a mind comfortable in a collective reality that only 
focuses upon a very small portion of a large reality.  
 Reductively, we can say, the collective sphere teaches the mind to distort. We 
cannot argue that distortion is a natural tendency for the mind, although many might. Due 
to the great tenacity and strength that the collective sphere employs in promising that the 
individual mind becomes a parcel of the collective, it is easy to ignore the changes that 
the mind has accumulated from its earliest state. Faulkner’s Light in August is a 
wonderful exemplification of this idea. Eileen Bender argues that in writing the novel, 
Faulkner seems to intend his setting to serve as an “unearthly backdrop…for the 
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objectification of delirious associations and interpretations” (Bender 7). The most 
common reference to Light in August, in regards to any sort of memorial studies, 
particularly with regards to these issues of distortion, is Faulkner’s opening paragraph of 
Chapter Six, which reads the following: 
Memory believes before knowing remembers. Believes longer than recollects, 
longer than knowing even wonders. Knows remembers believes a corridor in a 
big long garbled cold echoing building of dark red brick sootbleakened by more 
chimneys than its own, set in a grassless cinderstewnpacked compound 
surrounded by smoking factory purlieus and enclosed by a ten foot steel-and-wire 
fence like a penitentiary or a zoo, where in random erratic surges, with 
sparrowlike childtrebling, orphans in identical and uniform blue denim in and out 
of remembering but in knowing constant as the bleak walls, the bleak windows 
where in rain soot from the yearly adjacenting chimneys streaked like black tears. 
(Light in August 119) 
There is surely a great deal to be said about this paragraph. Critics such as Wolfgang 
Schlepper argue that “it’s overall meaning is clearly that the past is not something 
finished and done with, but plays an important part in man’s life” (Schlepper 182). There 
is a point to be made for such an argument, but I believe Schlepper to fall short of 
Faulkner’s true intent.  
 This opening paragraph of Chapter Six seems deliberately to exclude any allusion 
to one particular person, a device that suggests the universal nature of the subject matter. 
However, what exactly is the subject matter? Schlepper writes that the paragraph 
obviously “has something to say about ‘memory,’ without, however, offering an 
 140 
immediately intelligible and conclusive statement. Apparently, there are two sources of 
ambiguity in the three sentences, one being of syntactical, the other of a semantic kind” 
(Schlepper 183). The greatest amount of confusion appears in the third sentence with its 
lack of subject. Schlepper suggests that “memory” as the subject of the first sentence is 
the subject to apply to the second and third sentences. Doing so would bring about an 
interpretation that mirrored many of the concepts and conclusions that we have discussed 
throughout this thesis. The first sentence, “Memory believes before knowing 
remembers,” invokes the idea that one must first believe the reality in order to remember 
the reality. But he expands upon this idea in the second sentence, saying, “Believes 
longer than recollects, longer than knowing even wonders.” When ascribed to memory 
this claim reasons that the mind eventually comes to believe all memories without first 
questioning if the reality from which they come is true.   
 This is again the tired mind, the one that forgets how to critique. The mind that 
“believes longer than recollects” and “longer than knowing ever wonders” is a mind 
entrenched in the collective memory framework. At this stage in development, the 
individual memory framework is no longer. The questioning of a problematic reality 
taught by the hands of an archaic collective memory has ceased. Now the mind just sits 
and accepts with the full protection of the collective sphere. The collective sphere at this 
point protects the mind from itself or what it once was. Although, perhaps we would 
better say that the collective sphere prevents the return of the individual memories. In 
doing so, the memories become trapped in this “big long garbled cold echoing” building, 
which Faulkner describes beginning in the third sentence. This place, whatever it may be, 
is desolate, to say the least. This imagery of the memories building, really the mind, as 
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“sootbleakened by more chimneys than its own” powerfully suggests the sources of the 
mind’s corruption. If we think back to the dust in “A Rose for Emily” that trapped the 
mind in an archaic state and prevented it from functioning properly with its collective 
sphere, we see a parallel with this soot. The soot is not coating the mind in so much as an 
archaic quality but darkening it with corrupted filth that acts as a film blocking out 
reason. We must find it now coincidental that Faulkner coats the socially aged mind in a 
substance impenetrable to any “light of knowledge.”  
 This mind that believes before it remembers has come to coat itself in soot—
“sootblackened by more chimneys than its own” placing partial blame on that individual 
mind. Faulkner blames the individual mind for succumbing to collective corruption. In 
taking part, the mind further buries itself. Coming to the last lines of the paragraph—“out 
of remembering but in knowing constant as the bleak walls, the bleak windows where in 
rain soot from the yearly adjacenting chimneys streaked like black tears”—we find the 
lenses of perception to be part of the principal issues to this aged corrupted mind. 
Metaphorically, the “bleak windows where in rain soot…streaked like black tears” 
indicate that the media of perception (the mind’s senses) are blocked and distorted. The 
mind cannot question the issues of the collective reality because the mind cannot perceive 
these issues, or so suggests Faulkner. Does the collective sphere then teach the mind how 
to perceive? Or do misconstrued notions of reality and poorly confabulated memories 
eventually cause the mind to falsify its own perceptions? The origin of the false 
perceptions is out of our hands to conclude; however, it does demonstrate that the 
corrupted mind is in a hopeless state. When we are to blame the building’s windows we 
find that the memories are ill-fated even before their inception because the mediums of 
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perception are obscured. When the mind cannot properly perceive, it cannot remember an 
accurate image of reality. 
 Is it then better for the aged, corrupted mind to forget? Let us think all the way 
back to Funes the Memorious. Funes was crippled by his infinite remembrance. To forget 
is to adapt the mind to the natural progression of the individual-collective relationship. 
While increased exposure of the collective sphere damages the individual frameworks of 
reality and memory, it still allows the individual to participate in knowledge. To forget is 
continuously to be able to know. To remember with no end is to collect experience for a 
purpose that will never come before the perceiving eye.   
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